Why a Subaltern Studies Critique of a Green Party Motion on Palestine Is Wrong—And Why It Is Ultimately Reactionary

Some Palestinian intellectuals have criticized a British Green Party’s call for one democratic Palestinian state in all of Palestine, arguing that it denies Palestinians agency to decide what their post-colonial future will look like, even though the motion has long been a core vision at the heart of the struggle for Palestinian liberation, is supported by intellectuals and activists within the Palestinian community, was written by a woman with Palestinian roots, exposes the colonial nature of the two-state “solution”, and whose adoption in the imperial core could weaken the insuperable obstacles that currently stand in the way of Palestinian self-emancipation.

27 October 2026

By Stephen Gowans

The Green Party of England and Wales recently called for one democratic Palestinian state in all of Palestine (ODS). My support for this position provoked a backlash from two quarters. 1) Jewish Zionists who object to the fact that ODS would mean that they would have to live with Palestinians as equals. 2) Some Palestinian intellectuals, working within the paradigm of subaltern studies, who said that it is up to Palestinians to decide what post-colonial political arrangement they want, not a British political party. They added that non-Palestinians should limit their solidarity to support for decolonization, full stop. Pronouncements on what a Palestinian state ought to look like after decolonization should be left, they said, to Palestinians alone to decide.

I’m not going to address the first objection, other than to condemn it as the expression of a family of ethno-nationalist political projects that include Nazism, South African apartheid, and the KKK. MAGA, Germany’s AfD, France’s National Rally, and other anti-immigrant nationalist movements are the contemporary expression of this reactionary ideology. Israel has established ties with many of these ethno-supremacist movements, even though some of them have histories of anti-Semitism. A shared commitment to ethnic homogeneity and antipathy to Islam and Arabs bind Israel to white nationalism.

I will address the second objection in greater detail, because I believe its claim that the Green Party is denying Palestinians agency is wrong and because it ignores important political realities.

The obstacles to the decolonization of Palestine are, at the present moment, insuperable, and likely will remain so for some time. The obstacles are Israel, its Zionist project, and the massive support the Jewish state receives from the United States and its wealthy allies. Also relevant is the almost total absence of any meaningful support for decolonization from the world community of states. Most states and political parties around the world support the two-state solution. Two national states, existing side-by-side, in Palestine, is not a project of decolonization. It is a project of legitimizing the Jewish colonization of the greater part of Palestine and the permanent dispossession of the land, homes, and property of the majority of Palestinians.

This means Palestinians cannot decolonize Palestine without the removal, or at least, the significant reduction, of these obstacles. The key obstacle, indeed, the linchpin, is US imperialism. Without staying the support of the United States and its allies for the Zionist project in West Asia, attempting to decolonize Palestine will forever run into Jabotinsky’s infamous iron wall. There are too few Palestinians, and they are too weakly armed, to counter US imperialism in West Asia without the aid of anti-imperialist allies in the imperial core. There may be a rough parity between Palestinians and Jews between the river and the sea, but every fight against Israel is a fight against the world’s most powerful imperialist state and its formidable coalition of allies. It’s not a struggle Palestinians, unaided, have even the remotest chance of winning.

Palestinians have no material support from any country that could make a difference. Iran helps, but there’s only so much it can do.  Its resources are limited, and are miniscule against the assets (mainly US) Israel can mobilize. Moreover, the country’s own struggles for survival limit its support. China, a supporter of the two-state solution, is neither interested in decolonization nor willing to stick its neck out for the world’s 15 million Palestinians. As for Russia, it has its own problems to deal with, without going to bat for the Palestinians, which it wouldn’t do anyway, since it values its friendly relations with the Israelis, who have far more to offer Russia than the Palestinians do.

In short, US foreign policy (which shapes that of its allies) is the main obstacle to Palestinian decolonization. Without US support for Israel, the ability of the colonizer to maintain its colony is seriously compromised. And it’s only by seriously comprising Israel’s ability to defend its Zionist project, that the Palestinians can emancipate themselves. Hence, the key question in any discussion of how to bring about the liberation of Palestine, is: How can US foreign policy be changed to allow Palestinians to carry out the decolonization of their country?

Of course, withdrawal of US support for the colonial project in Palestine in no way guarantees that another power won’t step in. So, it is important that, whatever is done to end support for the Zionist colonization of Palestine, that it be done internationally, and not simply in the United States alone. Still, the United States is the key. It’s difficult to conceive of decolonization becoming possible with Washington continuing to support Israel, even if every other state, per impossibile, doesn’t.

I should say that it’s probably the case that most people in the world are, at the moment, against Israel. At the same time, it’s probably fair to say that this is so, not because Israel is a colonizing country, but because it is carrying out a genocide that’s easy to see. Indeed, it’s probably true that most people don’t think of Israel as a country of colonizers. At best, if they think about Israel in colonial terms at all, it’s as a colonizer of the West Bank. I suspect few people realize that the “occupied territories” include not only the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, but what we call Israel, as well. All of Palestine is occupied.

Zionists have been engaged in an attempt to efface the Palestinians as a people for the past century. They have done so for the simple reason that the Palestinians are the legitimate owners of the land and it was stolen from them. So long as Palestinians exist as a people, they will try to recover their country, their land, their homes, and their property. But while the process of eliminating a people as a people is genocide, popular awareness of 1) the process and 2) the reality that the process constitutes genocide as scholars and international law define it, is very low. Since genocide is popularly understood as the mass killing of a group, and Israel has engaged in the mass killing of Palestinians in Gaza since October 2023, Israel is widely seen as, if not a perpetrator of genocide, then a perpetrator of mass violence. It is for this reason that the world has turned overwhelmingly against the state.

Shock at Israeli-perpetrated violence against Palestinians has set the stage for popular discussion of a political arrangement that would ameliorate the condition of the Palestinian people. The dominant proposal, backed by almost every state and major political party around the world, is the so called two-state “solution”. Owing to its almost universal backing, most people tend to think that two national states, existing side by side, is the best solution to what is termed the “Israel-Palestine conflict.”

I think it can be said without prejudice that the two-state solution is poorly understood by ordinary people outside of West Asia and North Africa. Most people outside these regions equate it with support for the Palestinian cause, when, in fact, it is really support for the Zionist cause. To see this consider the baseline two-state proposal. It accepts the Jewish colonization of 78 percent of Palestine (the territory Zionist Jews conquered up to the point the final armistice was signed in the 1948-1949 Israel-Arab War.) Palestinians would be granted the remaining 22 percent (the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.) And while the proposal allows for the return of Palestinians from exile, most would be returning to a Jewish state, in which they would become second-class citizens. Result: A Jewish colonial state covering four-fifths of Palestine is legitimized, along with apartheid rule over Palestinians who choose to live within the colonized part of what was once their homeland.

Clearly, then, the two-state solution does nothing to lift the obstacles Palestinians face in decolonizing their country. Moreover, while the US government, and almost every other state, pays lip service to the two-state solution, none are willing to do anything meaningful to bring it about. But even if they did, the end result wouldn’t be decolonization.

In order to decolonize Palestine, not only must Palestinians act to liberate themselves, but their allies outside of Palestine must also act to create the conditions that favor Palestinian success. In other words, non-Palestinians must pressure their governments to 1) renounce the status quo of one Jewish supremacist colonial state in all of Palestine; 2) reject the two-state solution as an alternative; and 3) allow the Palestinians to bring about the decolonization of their country.

There are, it seems to me, two possible decolonial projects which allies must pressure their governments to accept. The first can be called decolonization, without specifying the nature of the post-colonial state. This is an approach expressed in the slogan “From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be free.” Norman Finklestein criticized the slogan for being vague about its implications for Jewish settlers, to which Briahna Joy Gray scolded, “It’s not about the Jews, Norman!” A second approach is to say that what is needed is one democratic Palestinian state in all of Palestine, with equal rights for all, regardless of ethnic or religious identity. This is a proposal for a certain type of decolonization, one in which the character of the post-colonial state is specified in advance.

Some prefer the first approach because it does not tell Palestinians what a decolonized Palestine should look like. Maybe Palestinians would prefer an ethno-nationalist Palestinian state in which Jews are not welcome, or an Islamic state. Insisting that a decolonized Palestinian state must include Jewish settlers denies the Palestinians agency.

The argument against decolonization as an open-ended approach is that it’s far less likely to mobilize the support of non-Palestinians, especially in the critical United States, compared to an approach which appeals to liberal democratic values, as ODS does. Citizens of liberal democratic countries are more likely to respond favorably to the idea of a democratic state, in which all peoples are equal, than they are to an unspecified decolonization that may include expelling the Jews and turning Palestine into the Arab or Islamic version of the Jewish ethno-state.

The objection here is that it’s not up to non-Palestinians to say how Palestinians should construct a post-colonial Palestinian state, and that’s true, but it is unlikely that non-Palestinians will be moved to support anything but a liberal democratic postcolonial Palestinian state, and the support of non-Palestinians is a sine-qua-non of achieving conditions that make Palestinian success possible.

One is, thus, thrown onto the horns of a dilemma. If you call for a post-colonial Palestine as a liberal democracy you deny Palestinians agency. If you insist on Palestinians having the freedom to choose whatever kind of state they want—including an ethno-nationalist, Islamic, or anti-Jewish state—you sabotage any chance of galvanizing Americans and citizens of the other liberal democracies that prop up Zionism to pressure their governments to withdraw their support for a settler colonial Jewish state in Palestine.

As to the agency question, those who claim the Green Party is talking over Palestinians are tilting at windmills. Palestinians are free to accept or reject any idea their allies present, and do. It’s very likely that Palestinians don’t care overly much about what other people think, except insofar as what they think helps them advance their cause.

More importantly, the idea of one democratic Palestinian state in all of Palestine was not invented by the Green Party of England and Wales. On the contrary, ODS is “the historical Palestinian vision for liberation” articulated by such Palestinian liberation leaders as George Habash, Osama Hamdan, Ahmad Saadat, Nayef Hawatmeh, Leila Khaled, Raja Eghbarieh, Musa Abu Marzuk and Ghassan Kanafani.

Far from chiding the Green Party for calling for ODS, the One Democratic State Initiative (ODSI), a Palestinian-led group that advocates what its name suggests, welcomed the Green Party motion. The motion, it should be pointed out, was spearheaded by a Green Party member with Palestinian roots, Lubna Speitan.

ODSI contested, in The Palestinian Chronicle, an online journal led by Palestinian journalists and editors, the subaltern studies objection that the Green Party is denying Palestinians agency. “This accusation,” Alain Alameddine and Saman Hassan, two of ODSI’s principals wrote, “is based on the premise that it is Palestinians, not a political movement in the UK, that must decide the proper solution to the occupation of Palestine. Although it might sound reasonable or possibly even anti-colonial at first glance, it is fundamentally flawed. Standing against the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state in all of Palestine in the name of Palestinian self-determination is a laughable contradiction. Democracy is, by definition, rule of the people. Democratic states are precisely the tool that allows peoples to self-determine.”

ODS was the dominant position of the Palestinian liberation movement from it’s very beginning. To be sure, the Palestinian Liberation Organization departed from the longstanding Palestinian ODS position in 1988 in favor of accepting the Jewish colonization of 78 percent of the Palestinian homeland. It did so because the organization had been severely weakened, the international situation had become unfavorable to achieving Palestinian ambitions, and it appeared—wrongly as it turned out—that a pis aller Palestinian state within the two-state paradigm was achievable. A Palestinian state on 22 percent of the Palestinian homeland, given that circumstances at the time had become very unfavorable to achieving liberation, was one the Palestinian leadership was willing to accept for want of a better alternative. Importantly, ODS was ceded for tactical reasons, not because it was what Palestinians wanted, but because their political leadership was willing to make significant (and some argue foolish) concessions.  It is wrong, therefore, to accuse the Green Party of talking over the Palestinians and denying them agency when the party reflects a longstanding Palestinian position.

Moreover, ODS has the greatest likelihood of mobilizing support for decolonization among citizens of liberal democratic countries. This is important, because Palestinians cannot liberate themselves so long as the insuperable obstacle of support for Israel by the United States and its allies continues unabated.

Calling for ODS is not white saviorism or a pre-emption of Palestinian agency. It is a call for a position that has not only long had a home at the heart of the Palestinian liberation movement, but is the only realistic way to galvanize citizens of liberal democracies, including very importantly the United States, to pressure their governments to remove the obstacles they maintain which prevent Palestinians from liberating themselves. Palestinian allies can facilitate the project of Palestinian liberation by sweeping away the obstacles to decolonization that frustrate the decolonial project. Popular pressure on political parties and states to follow in the footsteps of the Green Party represents, not the negation of subaltern agency, but the weakening of imperialism from within imperialist core.

The subaltern studies objection to the foregoing might be this: You don’t value decolonization per se, but decolonization as part of an ideology of inclusion and universal equality. Colonization is incompatible with your ideology—so you oppose it. Yours is a Marxist socialist view. It is no accident that the vision which you say lies at the heart of the Palestinian liberation movement—that of one democratic Palestinian state in all of Palestine, in which everyone is equal regardless of their ethnic or religious identity—is the vision of Marxist socialist Palestinians. Almost every one of the Palestinian liberation leaders you cite to make the case that ODS is a core Palestinian demand—George Habash, Ahmad Saadat, Leila Khaled, Ghassan Kanafani—were or are Marxist-Leninists who belong or belonged to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It would be more accurate to say that ODS is a core Marxist socialist demand, that has been made by Marxist Palestinians. Likewise, the ODSI, which you adduce as a Palestinian group which promotes ODS, is led by socialists who favor a socialist post-colonial future. And while the Green Party of England and Wales isn’t socialist, it is certainly of the Left and many of its members embrace a political program of inclusion and universal equality. Finally, you, yourself, are a Marxist. Hence, what you’re arguing for is a Palestine based on the Marxist vision of inclusion and universal equality which, by implication, is necessarily a decolonized one. What you’re not arguing for, however—and, indeed, what you’re implicitly arguing against—is the freedom of a subaltern people to self-determine its future in any way it pleases, including by building a post-colonial society that is exclusive and unequal.

To this charge I plead guilty.

Nazis argued that Germans were a subaltern people, colonized by the Jews. The Nazi program was largely based on a project of decolonization (as they saw it) and the creation of a post-colonial future of exclusion and inequality, where the subaltern, the German volk, would now be supreme, and the colonizer, the Jews, would be excluded (or exterminated, the ultimate form of exclusion.) Today’s white nationalist movement stands in the same tradition. It is animated by fear of colonization by Arab immigrants and Islam (as well as Mexicans, Central Americans, and Somalis in the United States) and the descent of people of white skin color into subaltern status. Hence, they favor a pre-emptive decolonization, carried out in the deportation of the immigrants in order to recover an imagined ethnically homogenous society. They look to Israel, with its inequality and exclusion, as a model.

It can’t be denied that there are Palestinians with the same vision; who favor a post-colonial Palestine in which Jews are either excluded or subordinated; and where rights are tied to ethnic or religious identity and favor indigenous Palestinians or Muslims or both. Proponents of subaltern sovereignty argue that the colonized ought to be able to self-determine a future based on the exclusion and oppression of their colonizer. Some Marxist socialists are even willing to accept this point of view, arguing, for example, that the ANC’s failure to expel whites from South Africa accounts for why the country’s indigenous people remain mired in poverty decades after liberation. This ignores the reality that indigenous Africans remain poor for the simple reason that South African governments have done nothing of any significance to change the economic conditions of the black majority. They haven’t, for instance, undertaken meaningful programs of land redistribution and economic democratization.  That’s not to say that matters would have been any better had they done so. In neighboring Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe championed a program of land reform and economic redistribution that was assailed, undermined, and sabotaged by the countries of the imperial core. The failure of the vast majority of post-colonial countries to make significant strides in improving the lives of their citizens have had nothing to do with whether settlers were expelled and everything to do with the fact that these states were decolonized politically, but not economically; and the few that tried to decolonize economically, as Zimbabwe did, felt the full weight of the rich countries come crashing down upon their heads. As Domenico Losurdo once put it, “The imperialist countries say ‘You want freedom? Fine, go ahead and starve.'”

There are, of course, great exceptions. South Korea and China spring to mind. But these two countries have enjoyed exceptional circumstances. South Korea was on the frontline of the Cold War. The United States turned a blind eye as Seoul pursued decidedly anti-market, anti-free trade, and state dirigiste measures to build its economy—measures that Washington would never have allowed any other state under its umbrella to pursue, but did allow South Korea to pursue, because it was important that South Korea surpass North Korea economically. China, by virtue of being a behemoth that cannot be easily pushed around, whose vast market has always proved alluring to investors and exporters, and whose Communist government has used planning and public ownership to guide economic development, has been able to achieve unequalled success. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that Palestine, South Africa, and China are very different places with very different colonial histories and very different economic potentials. The experience of one offers little insight into the developmental possibilities for the other.

To sum up, the debate between those who say Palestinians should seek one democratic Palestinian state in all of Palestine, based on inclusion and equality versus those who counter that Palestinians must be granted the latitude to define their future in whatever fashion they please, is really a debate over values: universal equality and inclusion versus the sovereignty of the subaltern to oppress others in an unequal post-colonial state, if that’s what they want to do. I would argue that the second, however much it masquerades as being radical, is ultimately reactionary, and is little more than a rationalization to be used by the formerly colonized to match their erstwhile colonizers in bile, enmity, and ugliness.

As a Marxist socialist I cannot help but be the ally of anyone fighting for inclusion and universal equality. This is why ODS is appealing. It is a program of replacing exclusion and inequality with inclusion and equality; of fighting fire with water, not fire. Indeed, I would say it is the only defensible Marxist socialist position. Neither can I help but repudiate any view which rationalizes exclusion and inequality, as does both the two-state solution and the subaltern studies paradigm. Proponents of these two positions differ only in that the former favors the exclusion and inequality of the Palestinians and the latter is willing to accept the exclusion and inequality of the Jews.

France Had a Two-State Solution Too: It Was Called Vichy.

Communists were opposed to the two-state solution for France. It is a mistake for them to accept the two-state solution for Palestine.

9 October 2026

By Stephen Gowans

Pro-Zionist communists, such as the Communist parties of the United States, Canada, Britain, and China, support the two-state “solution,” a euphemism for the colonization of 78 percent of Palestine. Many base their support on the argument that a) communists must allow Palestinians to decide the solution to the problem of Jewish colonization of their homeland and b) that most Palestinians favor the two-state proposal. The first part of the argument is logically flawed. The second part is empirically invalid.

Let’s begin with the second part.

A little over a year ago, The Wall Street Journal reported that “Polls in recent years have shown that only a minority of Israelis and Palestinians support the idea” of a two-state solution. Among Palestinians, “just 28 percent of those interviewed … supported such a plan, while 64 percent opposed it.” A Gallup poll released this month showed that 58 percent of Palestinians interviewed in the West Bank and Jerusalem oppose the two-state proposal. (Palestinians in Gaza, could not, for obvious reasons, be surveyed.) As Mondoweiss, an independent, non-profit news website focused on Palestine concluded, “Most Palestinians disagree with a two-state solution.”

The truth of the matter, however, is that no one really knows what the Palestinians support or don’t support. That’s because Palestinians are never surveyed as a people. On the question of two states versus one state, Palestinians in occupied Palestine ’67 may be surveyed, but neither Palestinians in occupied Palestine ’48 (Israel) nor Palestinians in the diaspora are polled about their preferences. The best that can be said, therefore, is that there’s no evidence the Palestinians favor two states and what partial evidence we have suggests they don’t.

In 1947, when partition of Palestine was proposed by the United Nations General Assembly, Palestinians were dead set against it. It shouldn’t be difficult to understand why. Palestinians were expected to hand over 56 percent of their country to recent immigrants who made up only one-third of the population, while they would keep only 42 percent of their homeland. (Jerusalem, two percent of the territory, was to be internationalized under the UN plan.)

The partition plan sparked a civil war followed by an international war. When the dust settled, Jewish colonizers had driven 83 percent of Palestinians who lived in what has since become 4 June 1967 (or Green Line) Israel out their homes, and refused their repatriation. At the same time, they expanded their territorial holdings from the 56 percent the UN General Assembly had proposed to 78 percent of Palestine. The colonizers said they had accepted the partition plan, but they implemented not one of the plan’s provisions.

For the next 40 years, Palestinians tried to recover their country, pursuing a vision of one democratic state in all of Palestine.  They met with no success. After decades of struggle, the PLO accepted what has become known as the two-state solution. At the time it appeared that an independent Palestinian state comprising 22 percent of Palestine, as prescribed by the two-state “solution”, had some hope of coming to fruition. But after decades of a failed “peace process” it became obvious to Palestinians that they had been sold a bill of goods. Instead of getting a Palestinian state on one-fifth of Palestinian territory, they were presented with ongoing colonization of the West Bank, the Judaization of East Jerusalem, and a concentration camp in Gaza.

Let’s examine the first part of the argument: Communists must allow Palestinians self-determination to decide the solution to the problem of Jewish colonization of their homeland.

Alain Alameddine and Saman Hasan are active in the Palestinian-led One Democratic State Initiative. They argue that “Standing against the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state in all of Palestine in the name of Palestinian self-determination is a laughable contradiction. Democracy is, by definition, rule of the people. Democratic states are precisely the tool by which people self-determine.”

On top of being a laughable contradiction, opposing the call for a decolonized Palestine is, for communists, an ideological contradiction. Following Lenin’s lead, communists have always favored decolonization, but somehow their support for decolonization has stopped short of Palestine. Lenin didn’t call for the liberation of the world’s oppressed people, except the Palestinians.

Furthermore, no communist would ever have said “The French must be allowed the self-determination to decide whether to accept the partition of their country into a German colony with a capital at Paris (comprising 60 percent of France), and a French state with its capital at Vichy (comprising 40 percent.)  Nor would they have said that the French have accepted that their country should be partitioned, as evidenced by the agreement of their government with the Germans, so we’re going to support the French right to a self-determined “two-state solution.” Any communist who accepted a two-state solution for France would have been justifiably denounced as a collaborator with German colonialism, and hardly a communist at all.

There’s a further contradiction. Pro-Zionist communists say their support for the two-state solution is based on letting Palestinians lead the way, the only true anti-colonial position. The problem with this argument is that pro-Zionist communists have never allowed Palestinians to lead the way.

  1. They supported the transfer of 56 percent of Palestine to Jewish colonizers in 1947, even though Palestinians were vehemently opposed.
  2. Today, they continue to support the two-state proposal despite the fact that there’s no evidence the Palestinians support it and good reason to believe they don’t.

The only lead pro-Zionist communists have ever followed is that of Moscow, and today, China and Cuba. Moscow reversed the position of the communist movement in 1947 from anti-Zionism to pro-Zionism and from support for one secular democratic Palestinian state in all of Palestine to support for the Jewish colonization of the better part of the Palestinians’ homeland. The volte-face was carried out for Soviet geopolitical reasons. Stalin believed the Zionists were committed socialists whose opposition to Britain would make them good allies. Leaving aside the question of whether this policy turned out to be an opportunist blunder, it’s absurd that pro-Zionist communists today mimic a policy based on the realpolitik of a state that has been dead for 35 years!

To sum up, many communists think they’re anti-Zionist because they criticize Israel and (say they) stand with the Palestinians (though it’s not clear how they can claim to stand with the Palestinians while supporting a two-state solution that denies Palestinians self-determination in most of their homeland.) Anti-Zionism is a rejection of the project of establishing an ethno-supremacist Jewish state in a colonized Palestine. Supporting the two state “solution”, a euphemism for supporting the Jewish colonization of 78 percent of Palestine, is not anti-Zionism. It is the very opposite.

The pro-Zionist two-state “solution” is clearly at odds with the communist tradition of opposing colonization. It is also at odds with the call for one secular democratic Palestinian state in all of Palestine, the position of the communist movement before the Soviet Union’s 1947 realpolitik volte-face, as well as that of the Palestinian Marxist-Leninist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Finally, we should recognize the absurdity that lays at the heart of pro-Zionist communist support for the two-state proposal. It assumes that Palestinians would actually prefer the occupation of 78 percent of their land over its liberation. This idea is as absurd as the notion that the French would have preferred a state based at Vichy to the liberation of all of France.

Alain Alameddine and Saman Hasan of the One Democratic State Initiative point out that “A number of movements such as Citizens in a State (Lebanon), the Democratic Popular Unity Party (Jordan), Democratic Socialists of America (USA) [though this is unclear: see comments below, and] Diem25 (Europe)” support some version of one democratic Palestinian state in Palestine. And of course, so too does the Green Party of England and Wales, whose recent support for this position, has been widely covered in the news media.  Ironically, it is reformists, not revolutionaries, who are taking the lead in building anti-Zionist platforms and calling for decolonization of Palestine.

Communists must do more than oppose genocide and accept Israel’s existence as a settler colonial state. As Alameddine and Hasan write “The Israel you have seen over the past three years is the one we have been seeing over the past 78 years. It is the only Israel there is—a danger to Palestine,” the Levant, “and the world. The time for non-solutions is over. We must push forward the dismantling of the settler state and the establishment of its antithesis,” one secular democratic Palestinian state in all of Palestine.

Would Lenin Support the Two State “Solution” or a Decolonized, Secular, Democratic State in All of Palestine?

7 October 2026

By Stephen Gowans

Many Communist parties are pro-Zionist, even if they express solidarity with Palestinians. Their pro-Zionism lies in their support for the so-called two-state “solution,” a proposal to create a Palestinian state in historic Palestine, alongside a Jewish state. What makes this position pro-Zionist is its acceptance of a colonial Jewish state.

Israel, conceived as that part of Palestine colonized by Jewish settlers by the end of the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War, is based on the colonization of the greater part (78 percent) of historic Palestine. (What Israel is, in fact, as opposed to in theory, is based on the colonization of all of historic Palestine, plus the Syrian Golan Heights, but for the purposes of this discussion, let’s stick with so-called Green Line Israel, the Jewish state before it took over the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.). Hence, endorsement of the two-state “solution” is, in part, an endorsement of the colonization of the greater part of Palestine.

Pro-Zionist Communist parties call for a Palestinian state to be created on the 22 percent of the Palestinians’ homeland that Jewish colonizers failed to colonize from 29 November 1947 to 20 July 1949. Even if one were to (incomprehensibly) accept the legitimacy of colonization, why would one accept such a grossly unbalanced division of territory, considering that Palestinians outnumber Israeli Jews? (There are about nine million Palestinians living in historic Palestine and refugee camps versus about 7.4 million Israeli Jews.) Two-state supporters somehow think their proposal is fair, though it’s difficult to see how giving part of one people’s country to another is fair, or how a division that gives four-fifths of the territory to settlers and one-fifth to a greater number of natives is equitable, notwithstanding the fact that giving away any of it to another people is unfair to start.

Some supporters of the pro-Zionist Communist parties say that the parties’ backing of the two-state proposal is based on what Palestinians and their political leaders want, and that they’re only reflecting the aspirations of the Palestinians themselves. This is clearly not the case, since the Communist movement’s support for partition—and hence for the Zionist colonization of a part of Palestine—dates to late 1947, when Palestinians were overwhelmingly opposed to giving up part of their country to Jewish colonizers. (The proposal, which the Soviet Union endorsed, assigned 54 percent of Palestine to Jewish settlers, who made up only one-third of the population, while the Palestinians were allocated 42 percent, even though they comprised two-thirds of the population. Two percent was to be internationalized.) Despite fierce Palestinian opposition, the Communist movement backed the colonialist project anyway because it accorded with the geopolitical goals of the Soviet Union. The views of Palestinians didn’t count. Moscow saw the Zionists as committed socialists whose opposition to Britain marked them out as anti-imperialists and, therefore, potential allies. This position turned out to be, not only a moral and ideological blunder, but a political one, as well. The Zionists, as it soon became evident, were not allies.

Communists continued to back a colonial Zionist state in Palestine during a period when all Palestinian political leaders called for one democratic state in a decolonized Palestine, the very same position that, ironically, Communists themselves had staked out prior to reversing course in late 1947. For example, on the eve of the Communist volte-face, Communists of the British Empire called for “the creation of a free, independent and democratic Palestinian state, which will guarantee equal rights of citizenship with full religious freedom and full opportunities to develop their culture to all its inhabitants, Arab and Jewish.” Arab and Palestinian political leaders adopted the same position, but after 1947, their views didn’t matter much to the Communist movement. It continued to accept the Jewish colonization of part of Palestine.

If Communists couldn’t legitimately use the excuse in 1947 that they were docilely reflecting the political preferences of the Palestinians, they still can’t. A Gallup poll released yesterday, shows that six of 10 Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem (Gaza for understandable reasons couldn’t be surveyed) are opposed to the two-state proposal.

The rejection of the two-state proposal meshes with the view of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist-Leninist party active in the Palestinian armed resistance. It vehemently opposes the two-state proposal and calls, instead, for a single, secular, democratic Palestinian state in all of historic Palestine.

Palestinian opposition to what scholar Khalid Rashidi has called “the two-state illusion” is understandable. In 1988 the PLO dropped its goal of achieving a democratic state in a decolonized Palestine in favor of the two-state proposal. Since then, it has become clear that neither Israel, nor its partners in North America and Western Europe, have any intention of allowing the vision of a Palestinian state to come to fruition.  The two-state proposal has proved to be a mirage, peddled to Palestinians to pacify them with pie in the sky while Jewish colonizers gradually Judaize that part of historic Palestine they have yet to formally annex.

Israel has taken over much of the West Bank, and in ways that make anything remotely resembling a viable Palestinian state impossible to achieve. Even were there a genuine will to create a Palestinian state in the small part of historic Palestine the two-state proposal deigns to grant the Palestinians (and time has demonstrated that there isn’t), the project—never politically or morally acceptable to begin with—is long past feasible.

The Green Party of England and Wales—perhaps hearing the echoes of the British Empire Communists’ call for a single, decolonized, democratic state in Palestine—has recently called for the same. Ironically, a reformist party has staked out an unequivocally Leninist position, while the heirs of Lenin (some of them) have clung mightily to a reformist position.

The Green Party’s call for decolonization has prompted the One Democratic State Initiative to ask what is keeping other left organizations from doing the same. The Initiative is a Palestinian political project aimed at shifting the focus of those involved in the Palestine question from solidarity with Palestinians and criticism of Israel alone, to campaigning for decolonization, much as Communists campaigned for the decolonization of South Africa and the establishment of one, democratic state, where blacks and whites live as equals.  

Communists need to consider what the ODSI asks. Will their involvement with the question of Palestine be limited to rhetorical solidarity with Palestinians and criticism of the Jewish state—undertaken within the framework of the pro-Zionist two-state illusion—or will they reject colonization, as Leninists must, and endorse what the movement once supported: a decolonized secular democratic state in all of historic Palestine, with equal rights for all, regardless of ethnicity or religion?

Whether the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, or Israel, It’s All Stolen Land

By Stephen Gowans

13 June 2026

According to the Israeli daily Haaretz, “left-wing UK leaders” are “slamming” an Israeli real-estate event, alleging that it seeks to sell properties to Jews on stolen West Bank land.

While efforts to impede the ongoing Judaization of Palestine are commendable, there is a fundamental problem that lurks in the campaign’s understanding of what is and isn’t stolen Palestinian land. The reality is that all the land in historic Israel that is claimed by Jewish settlers—both within the 1967 borders and outside—is stolen.

Failing to acknowledge this reality implicitly legitimizes Israeli colonialism and all earlier thefts of Palestinian land. While it identifies land stolen in 1967 as Palestinian, it tacitly accepts land stolen in 1948 as legitimately belonging to Zionist settlers.

Of course, it can’t be true that land taken from Palestinians by Zionist violence in 1967 is Palestinian land, while land taken from Palestinians by Jewish settler violence in 1948 is not.

All the same, the illogic is concealed behind the claim that the violent transfer of Palestinian land to the new Israeli state in 1948 was legitimized by the UN partition plan.

This view, however, is wrong for a number of reasons.

1.) The plan was legally invalid, since it was based on a General Assembly resolution, and

1a.) General Assembly resolutions are non-binding, and

1b.) the General Assembly didn’t have the authority to partition Palestine. (Indeed, the UN Charter accords to neither the General Assembly or the Security Council the authority to create new states);

2.) The Palestinians rejected the plan;

3.) The Zionists also rejected it, as evidenced by the fact that:

3a.) They didn’t implement it; and

3b.) They conquered territory in excess of what the plan allocated to them.

The plan apportioned 56 percent of Palestine to one-third of the population that was Jewish (mainly settlers), and only 42 percent to the Palestinians, who comprised two-thirds of the population. (Two percent was allotted to what was to be an internationalized Jerusalem.)

By early 1949, the Zionists—keen to control as much of Palestine as they could—had conquered 78 percent of the territory (versus the 56 percent they were supposed to have under the plan.)

Still, even if the partition plan had been legally valid, it remained flagrantly colonial, since it endorsed the expropriation of the territory of the existing inhabitants by a group of settlers animated by the project of expelling as much of the Palestinian population as possible and them imposing a regime of Jewish ethnoreligious supremacy on those that remained.

The partition plan has become embedded in international law, but colonialism does not become just by virtue of its inclusion in international law. International law is the instrument of the colonial powers that formulated it. They formulated it to defend and promote their interests—not to protect weaker peoples and states.

The great powers make, and have made, international law, and when it doesn’t suit their purposes, they break it. So it is that they have read the partition plan into the global legal order, even though the plan was invalid under the very same order.

There exists today one Jewish supremacist state in all of historic Palestine. All the land, both within and beyond the 1967 borders, is stolen. The ineluctable conclusion is that home sales to Jewish settlers anywhere in historic Palestine, (not only in the West Bank), are auctions of stolen land.

The competing view that only settlements in the West Bank represent confiscated Palestinian land, endorses the colonial fiction that Jewish settlement within the 1967 borders is not colonial and has not taken place on the dispossessed land of the Palestinians. On the contrary, all the territory controlled by the US-backed colonial settler regime is colonized and stolen.

The solution to colonization is not colonization of all but 22 percent of a people’s territory—what’s proposed in the two-state “solution”—but decolonization, the creation of one democratic state, in which all people are equal, regardless of their ethnicity or religious identity.

That’s what Palestinians proposed from the very beginning. It is a multidimensional solution, one that remedies both the problems of settler colonialism (by creating its antithesis, the democratic state of all its citizens) and the problems of anti-Semitism and anti-Palestinianism (by depoliticizing ethnic and religious identity and thereby establishing the full equality of individuals, regardless of the religion they practice or the people they identify as.)

From the 22 percent of historic Palestine that the two-state proposal envisages for a Palestinian state; to Jawlan (called the Golan Heights by Israelis; conquered by the US-backed colonial settler regime in 1967; ethnically cleansed of its Syrian population; settled by Jews; and annexed by the Israeli state in 1981); to Israel itself: it is all stolen land. Failing to recognize this reality perpetuates an injustice and blocks implementation of the only fair and democratic solution to the multiple problems at the center of the Zionist colonization of historic Palestine and Jawlan.

B’nai Brith Canada Invents a Crisis of Antisemitism to Pressure Governments to Criminalize Political Opposition to Israel

B’nai Brith Canada, a pro-Israel lobby group, has invented “a national crisis” of antisemitism by defining opposition to Zionism and criticism of Israel’s conduct as Judeophobia in order to press Canadian governments at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels to implement legal measures to criminalize pro-Palestinian and anti-Zionist political positions.

30 April 2026

By Stephen Gowans

On April 27 B’nai Brith Canada issued its Annual Audit of Antisemitic Incidents, arguing that “Canada is in the throes of a national crisis of antisemitism.” The report documented 6,800 incidents of antisemitism” in 2025, the “highest volume recorded” since the group began its tracking in 1982.

What is B’nai Brith, how does it define antisemitic incidents, and what actions does it want governments to take to address the crisis it has identified?

B’nai Brith is a pro-Israel lobby group which “works tirelessly to support and defend Israel” and whose mission is to “stand unequivocally with the State of Israel,” according to its website. The group does not represent Canadian Jews as a whole. Not all Canadian Jews are Zionists or supporters of Israel. Instead, the outfit represents Israel and Jews in Canada who stand firmly with the Jewish state.

Significantly, B’nai Brith describes its support for Israel as “unequivocal.” It backs Israel, right or wrong. In 1988, a US warship, the USS Vincennes, shot down an Iranian civilian airliner, killing 290 people. Then US president George H.W. Bush refused to apologize for the incident, saying that “I will never apologize for America.” B’nai Brith is the George W. Bush of Israel. It will never apologize for what it calls “the only Jewish state in the world.”

The group’s commitment to defending Israel is evidenced in its definition of antisemitism. The organization uses the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) Working Definition of Antisemitism, prepared by an outfit that is as ardently pro-Israel as the B’nai Brith.  The IHRA definition has been widely criticized for 1) not being a definition at all, but a list of examples of what the group calls antisemitism, with no explanation of the principles than undergird the examples; and 2) for including anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel in three of its 11 examples.

The IHRA cites the following as an example of Jew hatred: “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination.” While anti-Zionists do not deny Jews the right to establish a state per se, they do deny Jews (and anyone else for that matter) the right to establish a national state on the country of another people. Israel’s existence depends on the non-existence of Palestine. In practice, Jewish self-determination is equivalent to the denial of Palestinian self-determination.

A careful and precise interpretation of the IHRA example above would exclude anti-Zionism as an example of antisemitism were an anti-Zionist willing to accept the creation of a Jewish state on a genuine terra nullius (unoccupied, unclaimed land). Indeed, I would argue that virtually all anti-Zionists fall into this category, since their opposition to Jewish nationalism lies not in Jews creating a state, but in the cancelation of one people’s right of self-determination (the Palestinians’) to assert another’s (that of Jews).

However, it is clear from the B’nai Brith report that the organization has interpreted the IHRA example to mean that anti-Zionism is antisemitism. The report describes criticism of Zionism, (e.g., that “Zionism is analogous to “settler colonialism”) as “demonization of Jews who believe in the right of the Jewish people to practice self-determination in their ancestral homeland,” and that this criticism, or “demonization”, creates “a moral justification for attacks that target the Jewish community.”

I would make a few points in reply:

  • Jews, to be sure, did have a state in Palestine in antiquity. But the Palestinians’ ancestral claim to the same land is equally strong. Indeed, it seems likely that today’s Palestinians are the descendants of Jews who lived in Palestine in antiquity, and were converted to Islam during the Muslim Expansion of the seventh century.
  • Palestine was the ancestral homeland of many peoples. That Jews once had a state there does not negate the rights of other peoples who have also had a presence in the same territory. The Palestinians, significantly, have an unbroken, multi-millennial presence in the land.
  • Criticism of Zionism does not create a moral justification for attacks that target the Jewish community. The categories Zionist and Jew are no more coterminous than are the categories Zionism and Judaism. There are more Christian Zionists in Canada than there are Jews, let alone Jewish Zionists. And not all Jews are Zionists; some are ardently anti-Zionist. Zionist and Jew are not the same. Criticism of Zionists is not equal to criticism of Jews. Likewise, criticism of Zionism is different from criticism of Judaism; one is a nationalist ideology, the other a religion.

It is likely that a majority of Jews in Canada support Israel and hold Zionist views. Based on this reality, B’nai Brith advances the sophistical argument that criticism of Zionism and Israel amounts to criticism of Jews (again, illegitimately conflating Jew and Zionist), and that, therefore, this criticism amounts to antisemitism. The argument is tantamount to claiming that anti-Nazism, at the height of the Nazi’s popularity, was an expression of hatred of Germans as a people. Only if one conflates Nazism with German ethnicity can this sleight of hand be pulled off.

Other indications that B’nai Brith defines anti-Zionism and pro-Palestinian positions as antisemitism:

  1. The pro-Zionist organization objects to pro-Palestinian student clubs at Canadian universities celebrating Palestinian resistance, decrying armed Palestinian resistance as “terrorism.” As an organization that stands unequivocally with Israel, we can be sure that the B’nai Brith regards the Irgun and Stern Gang—Jewish insurgent groups which, from 1931 to 1948, practiced terrorism in Palestine—as groups that resisted British colonialism.  Albert Einstein, Hannah Arendt, and the British preferred to call them terrorists, even fascists. Of course, one can be a resistance fighter and use terrorist methods, as much as a state can be a state and practice terrorism, Israel being an emblematic case. The categories are not mutually exclusive.
  • The pro-Israel group objects to the use of the terms “massacre” and “genocide” by Canadian journalists reporting on Israel’s conduct in Gaza and deplores the Canadian media’s “focus on civilian casualties and humanitarian imagery” along with the “presentation of casualty figures.” Moreover, it defines the following headlines as examples of anti-Israel media bias linked to antisemitism:
  • “Israel killing journalists and getting away with it, say advocates.”
  • “More than 400 dead in Gaza as Israel makes ‘extensive’ strikes ending ceasefire, standoff.”
  • “Winnipeggers rally to condemn Israel’s attacks on Iran, humanitarian crisis in Gaza.”

The points above make clear that the B’nai Brith is little more than a pro-Israel public relations outfit that objects to any and all criticism of Israel, and seeks to neutralize opposition to the state it tirelessly defends and stands by unequivocally by smearing the state’s opponents as Jew haters.  In the organization’s view, pro-Palestinian, anti-Zionist, and Israel-critical positions are antisemitic by definition. Political positions are cast as expressions of irrational hatred. When it reports that there is a crisis of antisemitism in Canada, what the Israel lobby group really means is that there is a growing tide of opposition to Zionism, hostility to Israel’s conduct toward the Palestinians, and intolerance of Israel’s character as an ethno-supremacist, apartheid, state.

Name-calling critics of Israel and anti-Zionists as anti-Semites is fairly harmless.  But B’nai Brith has no intention of stopping at traducing Israel’s opposition. Its real intention is to pressure Canadian governments at all levels to criminalize pro-Palestinian and anti-Zionist positions by portraying them as hate-speech.

The pro-Israel lobby group calls on the:

  • Federal government to designate the Lebanese, Egyptian, and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organizations;
  • Provincial and territorial governments to prosecute antisemitic hate crimes, which, given the organization’s broad definition of antisemitic hate, includes any expression of opposition to Jewish nationalist ideology and ethno-supremacism and all support for pro-Palestinian positions;
  • Municipal authorities to ban “events that promote hatred”, by which it means pro-Palestinian and anti-Zionist events, including Al Quds Day.

To understand how dishonest both the B’nai Brith and its report are, consider what a pro-Palestinian report would look like if it mimicked the pro-Israeli lobby group’s approach. It would define denial of a Palestinian right of self-determination on the Palestinians’ ancestral homeland as anti-Palestinian hatred. Denouncing Hamas as a terrorist organization; denying the Nakba as a genocide; disputing the stamp of Israel’s conduct in Gaza as genocidal; dismissing as false or exaggerated reports of torture and sexual assault in Israeli prisons; denouncing the October 7 attacks as acts of terrorism rather a campaign of national liberation; rejecting the reality of Israeli apartheid; all of these–in other words, adopting the B’nai Brith’s own political positions—would be defined as hate speech rather than political speech. The media would be censured for describing October 7 as a massacre and focusing on Jewish casualties, as well as for failing to place Palestinian atrocities within the appropriate context. Media “bias” would be blamed for an avalanche of anti-Palestinian hate incidents. Finally, the report would call on governments at all levels to criminalize political speech that is critical of the Palestinian cause.

Canadians might think of the B’nai Brith as a Jewish advocacy group that works to overcome antisemitism. In reality, it is a pro-Israel lobby group that uses antisemitism as a weapon to smear people and organizations that oppose its pro-Israel political positions. The outfit poses as a representative of all Jews in Canada, but is, on the contrary, only a champion of Israel and Zionists, not Jews and Judaism. Its self-avowed mission is to work “tirelessly to support and defend Israel”, which it does, in part, by attacking opponents of Israel as antisemites, using a definition of Jew-hatred that includes opposition to Israel and the nationalist ideology on which the state is founded.

There is no crisis of antisemitism in Canada. The “crisis” is a myth invented by the Zionist outfit to pressure Canadian governments, at all levels, to criminalize pro-Palestinian positions and anti-Zionist advocacy—that is political speech—as hate speech. B’nai Brith must be resisted, exposed for the pro-Israel lobby group it truly is, and contained as a menace to the right of political advocacy.

They Demonize Our Revolutionaries

20 April 2026

By Stephen Gowans

On April 14, Ezra Klein, the New York Times’ columnist and podcaster, sought a “reckoning with Israel’s ‘one-state reality’.” He organized a discussion with Marc Lynch and Shibley Telhami, a pair of academics who had written a 15 July 2025 article in Foreign Affairs, The Promise and Peril of Recognizing Palestine. Their article asked whether “a two-state solution [could] emerge from a one-state reality?”

The discussion had two merits: First, it acknowledged that a Jewish supremacist state exists from the river to the sea. As Lynch and Telhami put it in their Foreign Affairs article:

Israel is not a democratic state incidentally occupying Palestinian territory. All the territory west of the Jordan River has long constituted a single state under Israeli rule, where the land and the people are subject to radically different legal regimes, and Palestinians are permanently treated as a lower caste.

Israel, in other words, is a democratic state for Jews, and a Jewish state for Palestinians, on whose country, land, and homes, Israel has been built. The philosopher Domenico Losurdo called it a Herrenvolk democracy—a democracy for (and only for) a master people. Others call it, correctly, an apartheid state. The three descriptions are congruent.

The second merit was Telhami, who offered a number of important insights. I’ll cite but one.

Israeli strategy from Day 1 has been to have what they call escalation dominance. It is a one-sided deterrence; it is that whenever there’s a fight with any party in the region, Israel can escalate it to the next level until it has the upper hand, and it will always have the upper hand. In effect, you’re saying you have to have strategic dominance over every conceivable party in the Arab world and the Middle East. That’s half a billion people. And you are a country of 10 million. That is why Israel doesn’t want Iran to have nuclear weapons

The last sentence, perhaps, requires some elaboration. Consider this: On April 18, New York Times’ reporters Mark Mazzetti, Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes began a report on the US-Israeli war on Iran with the following: “The United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on the argument that if Iran one day got a nuclear weapon, it would have the ultimate deterrent against future attacks.”

Note that the reporters didn’t say the two aggressors attacked Iran because it had threatened either country or any of their allies, or because they were motivated by human rights considerations. Instead, they wrote that the United States and Israel launched their war to prevent Iran from acquiring the nuclear arms that would provide Tehran a means to deter future US and Israeli aggression. These arms would, in Telhami’s words, check US and Israeli escalation dominance. Were Iran to achieve this objective, it would deny the two aggressor states strategic dominance over “half a billion people” and “every conceivable party in the Arab world and the Middle East.” Thus, it is not a nuclear threat to the physical safety of Americans and Israelis that Washington and Tel Aviv seek to deter, but a threat to their ability to dominate West Asia and its hundreds of millions of people.

Klein, a man who acknowledges that he does not count himself among those who want to see Israel cease to exist (though the idea that anyone should want an apartheid state to continue exist is troubling), offered his own commentary, some of which had merit.

  • He argued that “the one-state reality” [which is to say, Israeli apartheid, is] not accidental. It was, and is, not intended to be transient. It was being etched into the land — in stone and cement, in settlements and checkpoints, in the construction of walls and the demolition of homes.”
  • He noted that “More settlements were approved in the last year alone than in the previous two decades combined.”
  • He lamented that “Israel has allowed — has protected — a terrifying rise in settler and military violence toward the Palestinians who live” in the West Bank, adding that “There is no doubt, if you go there, who rules the West Bank — and it is not the P.A.”
  • He pointed to how “Israel has used the war in Iran as cover to invade Lebanon, displacing more than a million people, adding that “it is an open question whether any of those 600,000 Lebanese will ever be able to return to their homes.”
  • He acknowledged that Israel has no intention of allowing the Palestinians a state of their own.

Sadly, Klein’s merits are outweighed by his egregious faults. Significantly, he fails to explain how Israel’s resolve to deny the Palestinians a state of their own has left the Palestinians bereft of any option but violence to redress a fundamental wrong; and that this, by itself, explains the outbreak of Palestinian violence on 7 October 2023.  

Palestinian rebellion was met on the Israeli side by Tel Aviv stepping up its decades-long efforts to erase the Palestinians as a people. These efforts have been evinced, to use the language of the Genocide Convention, in the:

  • Killing of Palestinians in large numbers;
  • Inflicting on them serious bodily and mental harm; and
  • Imposing on them conditions of life calculated to bring about their demise.

Klein excuses these genocidal acts as “what any state and any people would do.” That’s doubtful. What any state and people might have done, and certainly could have done, is begin to redress the historical injustices that produced the rebellion. As Marx observed about the 1857 Indian Rebellion against the country’s British colonizers: “There is something in human history like retribution.” (The Indian Revolt, 16 September 1857) Or, to borrow from Marx again, with appropriate alterations of language for time and place: “However infamous the conduct of the Palestinians on 7 October 2023, it was only the reflex, in a concentrated form, of Israel’s own conduct”. Any serious effort to prevent future Palestinian violence, would address the root of the violence, not try, by escalation dominance, to suppress it, so that the fruits of the injustice Zionists have visited upon their victims — the theft of their land, homes, property, and country — can continue to be enjoyed by Israeli Jews into the future. That is what is meant when one says Israel’s response to the Palestinian rebellion is justified because it is what any state or people would do.

Genocide is built into settler colonialism. Settlers seek the land of indigenous peoples for the exclusive use of their own ethnic group. European settlers did so in North America, Australia, and New Zealand; German settlers did so in southwest Africa; and the Nazis tried to do so in eastern Europe, where Slavs, Jews, and Roma–the occupants of the land Hitler coveted for Lebensraum and German settlement–paid a terrible price. Jewish settlers have done the same to the natives of Palestine. In all cases, the result has been genocide. Settlers drive indigenous peoples off land they covet by expulsion, extermination, or both. Settler colonialism rests on the logic of the elimination of the natives.

Settler colonial states of the past have acted just as Israel, a settler colonial state of the present, has. But that’s hardly a justification for genocide. The Nazi SS Einsatzgruppen shot 34,000 Soviet Jews and dumped then in the Babi Yar ravine in September 1941 in retaliation for Soviet agents detonating mines in occupied Kiev which killed as many a three-hundred German soldiers. This was an instance of settler colonial forces undertaking harsh reprisals against the violent rebellion of the natives, in this case, against an ethnic group, Jews, viewed by the Nazis as being intimately linked to the political leadership of the resistance, or terrorists, as the Nazis called them. According to Klein’s logic, the Nazi reprisal killings were justified as “what any state and any people would do.”

It might also be pointed out that if Israel did “what any state and any people would do,” then Hamas and Hezbollah have done what any colonized and oppressed people would do. Colonized people never allow the colonizer to despoil their country, land, homes, and property, without putting up a fight. We might call this an iron law of history. To borrow Marx’s language, the inevitable rebellion of the Palestinians on 7 October 2023 no more lends itself to moralizing – for or against – than does an earthquake in California or a snowstorm in Canada, both inevitable events. It’s what colonized and oppressed people have always done and will always do. So, if we can point to genocide as what any colonial settler state and settler people would do to the people it’s oppressing, we can also point to violent rebellion as what any colonized people would do to the people who are oppressing them.

Klein’s heart bleeds for Palestinians who have been denied a state of their own and for the Shia of south Lebanon who the Israelis have driven from their homes, perhaps never allowed to return. But in his view, Hamas and Hezbollah, the inevitable response to Zionist settler colonialism, are anathema. Israel’s “right to reprisal against Hamas and Hezbollah,” he says, “is undeniable.” Sure, as much as the SS’s right to reprisal against Jews for the killing of three-hundred German soldiers at Kiev was undeniable. Zionists will object that you can’t compare Israel to Nazi Germany. But you can. As a settler colonial state, Israel shares much in common with its settler colonial cohorts: the United States, Canada; Australia; New Zealand; and Germany.

Klein must, in the words of the Syrian singer Siba, “demonize our revolutionaries,” as much as Israel must “eradicate our roots; demolish our homes; criminalize our existence; falsify our origins; separate our loved ones; and slaughter our children.”

Those who pity the oppressed but condemn their rebellion and demonize their revolutionaries are no friend of the oppressed. They aid the oppressor. But, then, I suspect Klein is alright with that.

Who Rules the US Revealed in Washington’s Cuba Demands

The idea that US foreign policy is driven by national security and human rights considerations is contradicted by the list of demands the US State Department issued to Havana last week. In reality, US foreign policy is driven by the interests of US businesses and investors, as the US demands make clear.

Cuba must:

o Transition to a market-based economy;

 o Expand its private sector;

o Open its door to foreign-investment;

o Compensate U.S. citizens and corporations whose assets and properties were nationalized in the 1960s;

o Release political prisoners;

o Expand political freedoms.

Washington “signaled that the United States would not tolerate resistance to its demands.”

The New York Times’ headline that reported on this meeting said that US officials travelled to Havana to lay out proposals, when, in point of fact, as the text of the article indicated, the US delegation issued demands to which it said it “would not tolerate resistance.”

Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Epstein Avant La Lettre

I have been reading Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Confessions, the first modern autobiography. I was shocked by one incident the eighteenth-century composer, novelist, and philosopher describes.

Rosseau writes of “a little girl of eleven or twelve,” named Anzoletta, who he and his friend, Carrio, bought from her mother with the aim of enjoying her “sensual pleasures,” that is, keeping her as a sex slave.

Carrio, who was a lady’s man, grew weary of always going to women who belonged to others and took it into his head to have one of his own; and as we were inseparable he suggested to me an arrangement which is not rare in Venice, that we should keep one between us. I agreed. The next question was to find a safe one. He made such thorough investigations that he unearthed a little girl of eleven or twelve, whom her wretched mother wanted to sell. We went to see her together…She was fair and gentle as a lamb. … We gave the mother some money, and made arrangements for the daughter’s keep. (The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Book Seven, Penguin, 1953, p. 302.)

Rousseau says that he developed a parental affection for the girl that prevented the relationship from developing into a sexual one. All the same, he and Carrio bought the girl with the intention of “being the corrupters of her innocence,” as Rousseau writes.

What is striking is that the theorist of liberalism passed over the incident without showing the faintest pang of conscience, though at other times he expressed great remorse for actions that by today’s standards pale in comparison with the intended sexual enslavement of a prepubescent girl.

Throughout his Confessions, Rousseau claims to tremble in outrage at wrongs and the exploitation of the weak, though clearly his aversion to injury inflicted on the weak was far from universal, and likely very much limited to inflictions upon people such as himself, and certainly not on little girls of poor families.

Why Does Genocide Happen Again and Again?

9 December 2025

Stephen Gowans

The genocide scholar Raz Segal has written an insightful article for the Guardian (“The genocide in Gaza is far from over,” 20 November, 2025) which I am flagging because it addresses a question that is almost never asked in public discourse: Why do genocides happen?

Segal asks this question because it is clear that the Nuremberg Trials, the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and education programs designed to instil the idea of “never again”, have failed. For, in this post-Holocaust world, the slogan “never again” is belied by the reality of “again and again.”

The common understanding of genocides is that they are caused by bad people with evil in their hearts. This is The Christmas Carol version of the expunction of groups. Bob Cratchet was overworked and underpaid because his boss, Ebenezeer Scrooge, was a miser with a heart of adamant, not because he was a capitalist operating in a world of cut-throat competition. Scrooge had two choices: pay his employees as little as possible and work them as long as possible, or go under. It’s no surprise he chose the former.

How many progressives attribute the problems of the working class to the greed of corporations, as if greed can be disappeared in a poof of moral suasion, or a visit from the Ghost of Christmas Future? Where does greed come from?  Scrooge’s greed came, not from his heart, but from bourgeois society and the capitalist imperatives which enslaved him. “We shouldn’t despise human nature,” counseled the eighteenth-century philosophe, Denis Diderot, “but the despicable conventions that pervert it.” Scrooge’s perversion was the despicable convention of capitalism, not a lonely childhood and a love affair gone sour, as Dickens told the tale.

 What are the despicable conventions that pervert human nature to produce genocides? For Segal, and others, it is a political project—one of building ethnically homogenous societies.

British settlers in Turtle Island (North America), Australia, and Aotearoa (New Zealand), carried out genocides against the indigenous peoples of these territories, not so much with the conscious intention of building societies of, by, and for White people, but of integrating the land and resources of the indigenous people into a growing world bourgeois system of capitalist production. Inasmuch as the indigenous peoples couldn’t be, and didn’t want to be, forcibly integrated into this system, they were eliminated as obstacles. Thus, the creation of ethnically homogeneous White Christian societies in these lands was a consequence of a capitalist driven process.

Nazi Germany carried out a genocide in Eastern Europe against people it deemed Untermenschen (sub-humans)—Slavs, Jews, Romani, Blacks, and mixed-race people. Of 18 million non-combatants killed by bullets, gas, exposure, exhaustion, and disease in the German war in the European East from 1939 to 1945, 12 million were Slavs and six million Jews. Ninety-six percent of the victims were claimed by Nazi imperialist violence—that is, violence used by the Third Reich to conquer and depopulate Slav territory in order to repopulate it with German settlers.  

Significantly, most of the world’s Jews lived within the territory that was the object of the Nazis’ settler colonial ambitions. The Holocaust, in the view of Carrol P. Kakel III, a US historian who has written on the American and German genocides, cannot be separated from Nazi settler colonialism. Six million Jews were killed, not for the sole reason that Nazis hated Jews—a view ingrained in the ideological zeitgeist—but as a consequence of a political project, namely, 1) clearing the European East (where the majority of the world’s Jews lived) of non-Germans to make room for an expanded ethnically homogeneous Teutonic empire and 2) eliminating an ethnic group the Nazis believed was, through the instruments of international finance capitalism and Marxist internationalism, seeking to destroy the German people as a nation.

Raphael Lemkin, the Polish-Jewish lawyer who introduced the concept of genocide in his 1944 study Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, attributed the Nazi genocide of the Slavs to the German settler colonial project, but insisted that the genocide of the Jews, the Holocaust, originated in psychopathological Judeophobia, unconnected to any Nazi political aim. Lemkin’s insistence that Nazi violence toward Jews was driven by psychopathology (thus, bad people with evil in their hearts) likely originated in his Zionism. A core belief of political Zionism is that non-Jews can’t help but hate Jews. As a consequence, Jews can never safely live among non-Jews, and must therefore have their own state if they are to be safe and survive as a people. Genocide scholar A. Dirk Moses has argued vigorously against the view that the Holocaust was the consequence of apolitical hatred, rooting the Judeocide instead, along with other genocides, in political projects. He criticizes the Genocide Convention for depoliticizing genocide—that is, for failing to recognize that genocides are carried out by ethnic groups against other ethnic groups they see as economic or political competitors. Often, but not always, the competition is over land. Or one ethnic group sees another as a threat to its survival.

Certainly, the origins of the genocide of the Palestinians can be found in a political project—clearing Palestine of its indigenous population to make room for Jewish settlers and the creation of a Jewish ethnic state. Zionist settler colonialism has obvious connections to the British-settler colonial genocides of the indigenous peoples of Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as the Nazi political project of creating an expanded German empire in the European East comprised solely of Aryan Germans.

Segal argues that the reason we live in a post-Holocaust world of again and again is because the political project that has regularly given rise to genocide—one of creating ethnically homogeneous states—continues to be seen as legitimate. One of the reasons (though not the only or even most important reason) the United States, Britian, Canada, and the Soviet Union backed the creation of an ethnic Jewish state in Palestine, was because they believed that ethnic states were legitimate, necessary, and desirable. Self-determination, the notion that every ethnic group should have its own state, enjoys considerable esteem. Thus, the idea of a single democratic state in Palestine, from the river to the sea, where everyone is equal, is frequently dismissed in preference to the creation of two ethnically homogeneous states existing side-by-side—one Jewish, the other Palestinian. This is the two-state solution. Zionists prefer one Jewish state in all of Palestine (today’s reality) and some Palestinians would like to see a Palestinian state from the river to the sea, cleansed of its Jewish inhabitants, save for the descendants of Jews who lived in the country prior to the political Zionist waves of European immigration.

Abolishing genocide and getting to a world of never again means abolishing the idea that the ethnic state is either necessary or desirable.  We don’t need ethnic states; we need civic states, where all people are equal and gender, sexual-orientation, ethnicity, national origin, religion, color, language, and all other ascriptive markers of identity have no political significance.  

However, ideas are not abolished by fiat; conduct is not deduced from principle. The fact that the land of the indigenous peoples of North America and Oceania offered attractive possibilities to metropolitan Europe, and the proletarians it disgorged to the colonies, created the idea of the desirability of settler colonialism. The idea of political Zionism arose in the anti-Semitism of Europe, which in turn arose in the need of Europe’s rulers to diffuse threats to their rule by turning their subjects’ anger against a scapegoat. The war against the Jews became a substitute for the class war against Tsarist oppression and capitalist exploitation.  A. Dirk Moses makes a compelling point that genocide is pursued as a solution to a political problem, but political problems arise not in the world of ideas, but in social and economic intercourse.

One of the surest ways of solving the political problem of two groups vying for political and economic resources within the same territory is for one or both of them to try to expel or physically destroy the other. So long as humanity is divided by ascriptive identity will identity groups vie for political and economic resources, and so long as identity groups vie for political and economic resources, the possibility of genocide will be ever present.  

The Arrest of Mahmoud Khalil: Un-American or Part of the US Tradition?

The arrest of Palestinian advocate Mahmoud Khalil for campaigning for an end to the oppression and genocide of Palestinians, would be un-American if the US state were devoted to ending exploitation and oppression. But inasmuch as it is ruled by and for an exploiting and oppressing class, Khalil’s arrest is American to the core.

By Stephen Gowans

March 11, 2025

US president Donald Trump has ordered the arrest and deportation of Mahmoud Khalil, a green card holder and legal permanent resident of the United States, for espousing what Trump denounces as “anti-American views” (which apparently means views at odds with his own.) Khalil’s arrest, Trump promises, is only the first of many. The US president has pledged to deport pro-Palestinian college students on visas who participate in what he deems “illegal” protests (which is to say those the monarch dislikes.) He has also threatened US citizens with permanent expulsion from their universities and their possible arrest for protesting against Israeli apartheid and the Zionist campaign of genocide.

As a student protest organizer at Columbia University, Khalil has been a vociferous advocate of an end to the oppression of Palestinians. This is what counts, to the fervently pro-Israeli Trump, as anti-Americanism. Trump professes to be (without hyperbole for once) the most pro-Israeli president ever. There is no question that he has made signal contributions to the Zionist project of despoiling Palestinians, as well as Syrians in the Golan Heights, of their countries, land, homes, and property—perhaps more than any other president has. As far as Trump is concerned, the rape of Palestine and southern Syria can proceed unhindered except for the resistance of Palestinians and Syrians, and with his unqualified support—not only in the provision of diplomatic and military aid in repressing the native resistance, but also in repressing the resistance at home.

Congresswoman Ilhan Omar has denounced Khalil’s arrest as “un-American.”  It would be more accurate to say that the detention belies the myth of America; it hardly stands as an exception to the reality of America. Systematically suppressing political advocacy, where it opposes the right of the wealthy to exploit labor, and the prerogative of the strong to take the property of the weak by violence, extortion, or law, has been a regular and predictable feature of US political life since the country’s birth. After all, the United States was built on a policy of manifest larceny—the theft of the country, land, and property of indigenous Americans and the stolen labor of enslaved Africans.

The 1919-20 Palmer Raids (organized by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer) saw 6,000 people arrested and 556 deported for expressing views deemed anti-American (advocacy of socialism or opposition to war). Through the late 1940s and 1950s, the US engaged in widespread repression of political speech in what is now called the Second Red Scare. (The first red scare followed the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution).

The New York Times’ Julian E. Barnes recalled the repression of “anti-American” speech during the First World War.

Congress first passed the Espionage Act in 1917 at the urging of President Woodrow Wilson [in] a bid to quell dissent against the United States’ support for World War I…

In 1918, a set of amendments prohibited speech considered disloyal or abusive to the United States.

During the war, for example, the producer of a film, “The Spirit of ’76,” was prosecuted under the act and sentenced to prison in 1918 because the government believed the movie undermined the British, a World War I ally, and was therefore seditious.

In 1918, Eugene V. Debs, the socialist candidate for president, was sentenced to 10 years in prison for a speech criticizing the wartime draft. [1]

Political speech is regularly repressed in the United States when the business-connected elite that runs the state on behalf of its class believes that the values it defines as “American”—namely, its own—are threatened.

As the philosopher and historian Domenico Losurdo explained:

In reality, although protected by the Atlantic and Pacific, every time [the US ruling class] has rightly or wrongly felt imperilled, [it] has proceeded to a more or less drastic reinforcement of executive power and to more or less heavy restrictions on freedom of association and expression. This applies to the years immediately following the French Revolution (when its devotees on American soil were hit by the Alien and Sedition Acts), to the Civil War, the First World War, the Great Depression, the Second World War and the Cold War. Even in our day, the sequel to the attack of 11 September 2001 was the opening of a concentration camp at Guantanamo, where detainees have been imprisoned without trial, and without even being informed of a specific charge, regardless of age. [2]

Losurdo went on the point out that the principals of the US state are energetic critics of rival states that suppress political advocacy in times of crisis–for example during invasions, military occupation, and threats of nuclear destruction (often engineered by the United States itself)–yet ardently repress political advocacy within their own borders in response to crises that are far less formidable than those the United States visits upon enemy states through its aggressions.

The notion may be shocking in light of what we have been taught to believe about the United States, but the truth of the matter is that every state is a police state—the US, and other self-described “free world” and liberal-democratic states, included. States exist both to advance the interests of their society’s dominant class, and to repress the resistance of those who the dominant class exploits. The political advocacy of the resistance is policed by the state, hardly at all when the resistance is weak and quiet, and more openly and viciously when it gathers strength and raises its voice. It is in periods of political tranquility, when the resistance of the exploited class carries on as a largely silent part of everyday life, that the character of the state qua police state is hardly evident, and the state favored by quietude fosters the myth that it is not a police state at all, but a champion of political liberty. It is easy to champion freedom of political advocacy when no one advocates ideas you don’t like, or those who do are voices crying out in the wilderness. But when the quietude of the subordinate class is disturbed, when its voice begins to establish reach, when it mobilizes and its actions become disruptive, the proclivity of the class in control of the state is to repress the militants, coopt the moderates, and threaten the remainder until they return to their accustomed passivity—in other words, the inclination is to reveal the police state for what it truly is. We should not say at these times that this is un-American, or un-Canadian, or un-British, and so on, but that the veil has once again been lifted from the police state because we are once again growing strong.

It’s important to understand that:

  • The US state (hardly alone among capitalist states) represents the interests of its wealthiest citizens and cares only for the interests of the many so far as doing so is necessary to create stable conditions for the tranquil transfer of economic surplus from labor to itself.
  • US domination of West Asia, a strategic and economic area of colossal importance, is significantly aided by the presence in the region of a Jewish settler state committed, by the very demands of its own survival, to repress the Arab and Islamic opposition to both its existence as a state as well as the United States’ existence as a regional tyrant. The relationship of the United States to Israel is one of symbiosis, based on sharing a common enemy, namely, the region’s forces of independence and national assertiveness.
  • The United States is the largest settler colonial state in world history, and is thus predisposed by its own traditions to support other settler colonial states, ceterus paribus; that is, when it makes sense to do so in light of the strategic and profit-making interests of the United States’ wealthiest citizens.
  • Christian Zionists—who believe it is their religious duty to support Israel—comprise a sizeable part of the US electorate. While their views are a matter of indifference to US policy-makers, the reality that they broadly support US policy (one that, unbeknownst to them, is rooted in the economic and strategic interests of the US ruling elite), is helpful in hiding the authentic reasons for US support of Israel behind a democratic facade. It can be said, falsely, that US policy reflects, in large measure, what US voters want. In reality, it reflects what the corporate and finance elite wants.

In light of the foregoing, we can conclude that in the face of growing support for Palestinians, and in the context of increasing opposition to the Zionist project, that the inclination of the US state—despite its professed commitment to liberal democratic values—is to ignore popular opinion and to try to crush political advocacy which contradicts its policy preferences. The myth of America not only includes the notion that the state is committed to free expression and political advocacy, but that it is responsive to popular opinion. The latter myth is contradicted by two important studies.

  • One in 2005 by Benjamin Page and Lawrence Jacobs, found that “public opinion has virtually no effect on foreign policy, which instead strongly tracks the preferences of internationally oriented corporations, which favor open access to trade and investment abroad. Page and Jacobs noted that experts seemed to have some effect on foreign policy, but that experts are also likely influenced by business groups.” [3]
  • A 2014 study of over 1,700 US policy issues by Page and his fellow political scientist Martin Gilens discovered that “economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial impacts on government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence.” [4]

In other words, growing popular momentum on behalf of the Palestinians and against their oppression by Israel will not turn US policy-makers into pro-Palestinians or significantly shift US foreign policy. US policy-making and US public opinion operate in non-overlapping spheres, with the former largely immune and indifferent to the latter. To paraphrase George Carlin, US policy-makers and their wealthy backers belong to a club, and 99 percent of US citizens are not in it.

Accordingly, growing support for an end to Zionist apartheid and the genocide against Palestinians will cause officials, not to shift policy in the name of democracy, but to lift the veil from their police state and to crack down on resistance to their preferred pro-oppression policy positions.

Is the state’s aversion to popular opinion and democracy and preference for repression in the face of growing opposition to its conduct, a reason to return to quietude? Hardly. It’s an invitation to look at political struggle realistically, as a class war in which violations of ostensibly cherished rights will happen, as they have always happened, when the latitude of those at the top to exploit and oppress those below is threatened by resistance. Victory is possible only if illusions are shed about the identity of the enemy and its true character. The United States, as much as any other state, is not a paladin of political liberty, but a police state standing on guard for the political and economic interests of its ruling class. For the rest of us, it is a police state, and always has been.

1. Julian E. Barnes, “What Is the Espionage Act and How Has It Been Used? The New York Times, August 15, 2022.

2. Domenico Losurdo, War and Revolution: Rethinking the Twentieth Century, Verso, 2015, p. 258.

3. Christopher McCallion, “A Better Foreign Policy Abroad Requires a Strong Labor Movement at Home”, Jacobin, May 30, 2022

4. Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics, September, 2014.

Is Glorifying Hamas’s October 7 Attack Strategically Unsound?

Jacobin’s Cloudy Thinking on Hamas’s Resistance and Palestinian Solidarity

“If no consideration in a political crisis has been addressed to the people of this country except to remember to hate violence and love order and exercise patience, the liberties of this country would never have been obtained.” British Prime Minister William E Gladstone [1]

November 1, 2024

By Stephen Gowans

Jacobin contributing editor Bashir Abu-Manneh has written a criticism of the pro-Palestinian protest movement (“Palestine Needs Mass Support, Not Sectarian Marginalization,” Jacobin, October 30, 2024), arguing that its effectiveness is clouded by poor strategic thinking. It is not, however, the protest movement’s thinking which is clouded, but Abu-Manneh’s own thinking, which is contradictory and self-refuting. In effect, Abu-Manneh urges readers to hate Hamas’s violence, love international law, and exercise patience, while defining the Palestinian cause as the achievement of Palestinian Bantustans alongside a Zionist colonial settler state. To make his case, he deploys a series of arguments which collapse under the weight of their own contradictions. I have set out his arguments below, and show how they are based on poor—and, ultimately, anti-Palestinian—reasoning.

The Jacobin contributor begins his article by attributing what he calls the cloudy strategic thinking of the pro-Palestinian protest movement to its members’ anger and frustration at Israel’s indifference to “the wrath of global public opinion” and their being “ignored and sidelined by warmongering elites.” In his view, emotion has impaired judgment. A “very small minority of vocal activists,” he writes, “have turned legitimate anger and frustration … into a mindless embrace of violence” which is playing “into the hands of those who want to see a popular antiwar mass movement discredited.”

“Most worryingly,” he adds, “some voices in the Palestinian solidarity movement have glorified Hamas’s October 7 attacks,” quickly noting that: “There is no question that Palestinians have a right to resist foreign occupation. That is an achievement of the decolonization era enshrined in international law. But it does not follow that everything the Palestinian resistance movement does advances the Palestinian cause.”

Let’s unpack this paragraph.

Abu-Manneh attributes the Palestinians’ right to resist foreign occupation to international law. But where does international law come from? Does it exist independently of humanity, or is it written by humans? And which humans write it? International law is formulated, ignored, or enforced, by the most powerful states, at their discretion. The international system is characterized, not by “the rule of law”, in which no state stands above it, but “rule by law”, in which law is selectively applied by those who have sway over it, namely, states with permanent Security Council vetoes, at least four, and possibly all of which, can be characterized as formerly if not current colonial states. One, the United States, originated, as Israel has, in settler colonialism. [2, 3] If the states that dominate the international system, and therefore the formulation and (selective) application of international law, were to decide that the Palestinians have no right to resist occupation, would their resistance be illegitimate? By Abu-Manneh’s reasoning, it would be. This gives us the first clue about how the Jacobin contributing editor thinks about the Palestine question. He regards it not as a question of settler colonialism (the theft of the Palestinians’ country, land, homes, and property and what to do about it), but one of international law, a law over which powerful states, many of them with histories of colonial or settler colonial domination over other peoples, have always exercised an outsize influence.  Palestinians may have the right of resistance in international law, but it amounts to little. Does international law, or the great powers who write and selectively enforce it, protect Palestinians as they exercise this right? On the contrary, these same powers raise Israel’s right of self-defense to an inviolable principle of the first order, while execrating, gagging, or punishing anyone bold enough to invoke the Palestinians’ right of resistance. At the same time, they sanction the killing of Palestinians who exercise their right as the necessary and desired outcome of Israel exercising its hallowed right of self-defense.

International law, in the form of the US, British, and Israeli-authored 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242, recognizes as legitimate a settler colonial Israeli state, implanted by force and by means of ethnic cleansing, on the four-fifths of a country known as Palestine which Zionist settlers conquered in 1948. This law does not grant the Palestinians the right to resist the foreign occupation of this part of their country.  So, yes, international law concedes a right to resist, but it is meaningless in fact, and to make matters worse, the right is conceded for only one-fifth of historic Palestine.

We can think of Israel as a settler colonial project which has consolidated its theft of Palestinian land, homes, and property in four-fifths of Palestine. We can think of it too as seeking to extend its larceny to the one-fifth of historic Palestine that has yet to be completely plundered. We can also think of international law as a means of legitimizing the theft. Alternatively, we can, as Abu-Manneh does, fetishize international law, seeing it not as the instrument of colonial and settler colonial states, used to legitimize the existence of Israel [4] but naively, as a neutral expression of universal justice.

After accepting the Palestinians’ right to resistance based on international law (and exercisable only in the one-fifth of the Palestinians’ country which Jewish settlers were unable to capture in 1948), Abu-Manneh writes: It “does not follow that everything the Palestinian resistance movement does advances the Palestinian cause.” This is true as far as it goes, but the statement is of little value unless we know what “the Palestinian cause” is.  In Abu-Manneh’s view, the Palestinian cause has nothing whatever to do with decolonizing Palestine, dismantling apartheid, and overcoming Zionist racism. Instead, the cause, in his view, is bringing to fruition the two-state solution as laid out in the 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242–that is, the achievement of a Palestinian state in one-fifth of the Palestinians’ country, alongside a Zionist colonial settler state, on the larger four-fifths. 

Now that we’re clear on what Abu-Manneh thinks the Palestinian cause is, we can ask why he accepts Palestinian resistance (in the abstract) but rejects Hamas’s Operation Al Aqsa Flood (as a specific instance of Palestinian resistance.)  According to the Jacobin contributor, any “reasonable cost-benefit analysis for the people of Gaza has to conclude that the price” of the 7 October attack (i.e., Israel’s retaliation) “is simply not worth it.” Owing to “a balance of power that is overwhelmingly to Israel’s advantage” the Hamas rebellion was, in his view, “a massive miscalculation.”

It is indeed true that there exists between Israel and the Palestinians a massive imbalance of power. But what does the fact that there is a massive imbalance of power mean? It means that Israel has been able to maintain an ongoing, unremitting, regime of aggression against the Palestinians, which continues the project, begun over one hundred years ago, of replacing one country, Palestine, with another, Israel, and displacing the indigenous Palestinians with transplanted Jews. This is an ongoing project. It didn’t stop in 1967, when the UN Security Council ordered Israel—without, as time has shown, the slightest intention of compelling Israel’s compliance—to withdraw from the new territories it had taken. It is not the case, as Abu-Manneh supposes, that the great imbalance of power is fixed and that the Zionist project is sated, with no further conquests on its agenda. On the contrary, before 7 October, each passing day was one in which ever more Palestinians were crushed under the wheels of the Zionist juggernaut. Settlements continued to be built in the West Bank. The Gaza blockade continued to make life miserable for Palestinians. Israel continued to threaten to Judaize the Haram al-Sharrif. Abu-Manneh assumes that there existed prior to 7 October a fixed status quo, which, however grim it was, was still better than what has befallen the Palestinians since. To the contrary, the condition of Palestinians was—despite the misplaced faith the Jacobin contributor has in international law—one of incessant weakening and deterioration. Palestinians faced, not a choice of standing still if they did nothing, or going backward if they provoked Israel’s fury, but if they did nothing, of going backward slowly, inexorably, until Palestinians and Palestine ceased to exist. It was a choice of dying on their knees or standing on their feet.

This is not to say that there are not miscalculations in struggle, and that Operation Al Aqsa Flood was not a miscalculation. It may have been. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that the attack didn’t unfold quite as the Hamas leadership intended. Far greater Israeli resistance was expected, and when Hamas fighters quickly achieved their limited objectives, the operation dissolved into chaos. [5] Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader who has since died in battle, remarked that “Things went out of control. People got caught up in this, and that should not have happened.” [6]

In decrying the 7 October Hamas operation as not worth the candle because the outcome has been a devastating Israeli retaliation, Abu-Manneh fails to blame the architects of the retaliatory ossuary: Israel and its principal backers, the United States and Germany, the former a veritable co-belligerent. One could argue that the carnage is due to both the provocation of Hamas (a distal cause) and Israel’s response to it (the proximal cause). Instead, Abu-Manneh chooses to lay 100 percent of the blame at Hamas’s door, removing the proximal cause (Israel and its backers and co-belligerent) from the equation altogether. This is blatant victim-blaming.

If that isn’t bad enough, the Jacobin contributing editor then denies Hamas any credit for the benefit of the 7 October rebellion. The benefit, as he puts it, is that “Palestine is now back in global political focus.” But why is it back? In Abu-Manneh’s view, “Because of Israel’s brutal genocide”, not because Hamas undertook an operation which included among its aims the rescue of the Palestinian cause from the oblivion into which it was rapidly sinking. [7] If Hamas is to be blamed for provoking Israel to accelerate the job of erasing the Palestinians—conduct hardly at odds with the history of Zionist settler colonialism (isn’t its point to eliminate the natives to make way for the settlers?)—then it must also be credited with placing Palestine back on the global agenda. Does Abu-Manneh believe that “the huge global protest movement … against colonization and occupation” and the radicalization of “a new generation of young activists,” would have occurred had Hamas or other resistance groups not carried out the Al-Aqsa Flood action or its equivalents? Palestine had fallen off the radar until Hamas acted. Now Palestine and the Palestinians are back with a vengeance. Abu-Manneh’s vaunted international law had done nothing, up to 7 October, to keep them on the agenda. Indeed, it was the failure of international law and the quietude of the Palestinian solidarity movement that galvanized Hamas to act.

Having dismissed Palestinian militant action as ill-advised in light of the enormous imbalance in power between Israel and the Palestinians, Abu-Manneh turns to international law as the Palestinians’ possible savior. In view of the fact that the UN and international law have played important roles in facilitating the Jewish settlers’ spoliation of Palestine and its indigenous people—especially UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of November 1947, which recommended the partition of the Palestinians’ country, and UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, which legitimized the Zionist settler state’s capture of four-fifths of Palestine, and the ethnic cleansing of much of the Palestinian population from it—the idea that the Palestinians should look to international law for salvation is wholly unconvincing; one may as well have asked Hitler to solve the problem of anti-Semitism.

All the same, Abu-Manneh is particularly encouraged by “the July International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling (July 19, 2024) [which] has deemed Israel’s occupation illegal.” But it should be understood thar the ICJ opinion has not deemed as illegal the Zionist occupation of a country called Palestine; it has only declared illegal the occupation of the one-fifth of Palestine which the settlers failed to conquer and ethnically cleanse in 1948. What encourages the Jacobin contributor, is thus, an ICJ ruling which presses Israel to accept the two-state solution, what Palestinian scholar Rashid Khalidi denounces as “a one-state, multiple-Bantustan solution.” [8] And how is the two-state solution—which Israelis vehemently oppose [9], and whose history is one of a false promise designed to keep the Palestinians passive while what remains of their country is gradually taken away from them—to be brought to fruition?  Through “focussed political work and organization” counsels Abu-Manneh—in other words, by mobilizing radicalized youth and the “huge global protest movement” to press countries to pressure Israel to grant the Palestinians the sop of a few Bantustans.  Abu-Manneh’s favored two-state solution, “has always been meaningless, a cruel Orwellian hoax,” concludes Khalidi. It “would effectively maintain the status quo in Palestine under a different form, with an externally controlled Quisling ‘Palestinian Authority’ lacking real jurisdiction or authority replaced by a Quisling ‘Palestinian state’ similarly devoid of the sovereignty and independence that attach to a real state.” [10]

Abu-Manneh’s thinking is problematic, if not naïve and, worse, revolting, on three levels.

First, it ignores his own assessment of public opinion. Israel, he notes correctly, is “protected from the wrath of global public opinion.” Moreover, “protesters and activists” are “ignored and sidelined by warmongering elites.” If Israel is insulated from public opinion, and protestors and activists are ignored, how is “focussed political work and organization” going to compel Israel to grant Palestinians the multiple Bantustans Abu-Manneh thinks will resolve the Palestine question? The imbalance in power between Israel and the Palestinians is indeed huge, but the yawning chasm is not only a military one, but a public diplomacy one, as well. If you’re going to say, don’t take on Israel militarily, because its military power is overwhelming, don’t, at the same time, say take on Israel in the realm of public opinion, without recognizing that Israel’s public diplomacy power is also overwhelming. This is surely clouded strategic thinking.

Second, in advocating a one-state-multiple-Bantustan solution, Abu-Manneh proposes that radicalized youth and the huge global protest movement accept Jewish settler colonialism and Zionist apartheid in four-fifths of the Palestinians’ country, in return for Palestinian Bantustans on the remaining one-fifth. Were the radicalized youth who Abu-Manneh celebrates to accept his program they would immediately become de-radicalized, for there is nothing radical about Abu-Manneh’s counsel. Neither is there anything progressive about it. Would a movement against apartheid in South Africa which advocated multiple Bantustans alongside a white supremacist state be called progressive? Of course not. So why would we think the equivalent for Palestine is acceptable? Indeed, it’s difficult not to conclude that the whole point of Abu-Manneh’s intervention is to persuade the global protest movement to deradicalize, on the grounds that this will somehow (he doesn’t quite say how) pay off in strategic gains. This comports with the mild, reformist, orientation of Jacobin—a periodical of the Left devoted to hating violence, loving order, exercising patience, and bartering principle for bourgeois respectability.     

Third, the energy of the global protest movement and radicalized youth—energy Abu-Manneh seeks to mobilize on behalf of his favored one-state-multiple-Bantustan solution—would hardly exist had Hamas not undertaken the very same Operation Al-Aqsa Flood he so deplores. Had Hamas accepted anything like Abu-Manneh’s counsel, Palestine and the Palestinians would now be virtually invisible and teetering on the precipice of extinction.

The Jacobin contributor believes that “glorifying” Hamas’s violence will frighten people away from joining the protest movement he acknowledges is already huge and global. In fact, the movement Abu-Manneh has set out to save from cloudy strategic thinking is huge and global despite, or perhaps because of, the “cloudy” thinking he deplores.  The Jacobin contributor also fears that failing to denounce Hamas’s 7 October resistance allows Israel and its supporters to discredit opponents of the Israeli’s genocide against the Palestinians. Operation Al Aqsa Flood, was, he argues, a miscalculation that is wholly responsible for the slaughter of tens of thousands of Palestinians. Yet, the operation hardly seems to have been a miscalculation from the point of view of preventing the erasure of Palestine and the Palestinians; it is responsible, at least distally, for revitalizing the pro-Palestinian movement, a revitalization Abu-Manneh welcomes, but all the same fails to give Hamas credit for.  The Jacobin writer appears to believe that there are ever more legions of people ready to join the global protest movement if only a very few voices in the Palestinian solidarity movement stop glorifying Hamas’s 7 October attack. His assessment is unconvincing. If more people haven’t joined the already huge and global movement, a more plausible explanation is that they see –to invoke Abu-Manneh’s own assessment of the impotence of public opinion—little point in being “ignored and sidelined by warmongering elites” as Israel enjoys its protection “from the wrath of global public opinion.”

It is unclear why Abu-Manneh believes that failure to decry Hamas’s 7 October uprising plays into the hands of Israel and its supporters, unless he believes, notwithstanding his endorsement of resistance in the abstract, that violent resistance against Israel is illegitimate. Could it be that his reference to the right of Palestinian resistance is mere lip-service? He says resistance is legitimate, but despite this, insists that glorifying the resistance of Hamas on 7 October plays into the hands of the Palestinians’ enemies. This is a contradiction. How could glorifying a legitimate act discredit the movement? Abu-Manneh might say the reason why is because Hamas’s resistance, albeit legitimate, was a miscalculation. But how does glorifying a Hamas miscalculation play into Israeli hands? It doesn’t make sense. It seems more likely that Abu-Manneh is a supporter of violent rebellion in the abstract, as an idea alone, suitable only for discussion in university colloquia, and certainly not as a project to be carried out in the real world.

The reality is that the revitalization of the global Palestinian solidarity movement wouldn’t have happened had Hamas not launched its 7 October operation.  Abu-Manneh fails to credit the very same operation whose glorification he deplores for re-igniting the mass movement he welcomes, presenting an argument that can hardly be taken seriously, namely, that the way to build mass support for Palestine is to glorify an international law which has achieved nothing for Palestinians, while defining the Palestinian cause as the achievement of an apartheid Zionist settler state in four-fifths of the Palestinians’ country, alongside multiple Bantustans in what is left over. 

Abu-Manneh’s clouded thinking recalls E.H. Carr’s riposte to the advocates of peaceful change. In his Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, Carr wrote, that the “attempt to make a moral distinction between wars of ‘aggression’ and wars of defense’ is misguided. If a change is necessary and desirable, the use or threatened use of force to maintain the status quo”—one thinks here of Israel’s vaunted right to defend itself—”may be more morally culpable than the use or threatened use of force to alter it.” [11] He continued: “The moral criterion must be not the ‘aggressive’ or ‘defensive’ character of the war, but the nature of the change which is being sought and resisted. ‘Without rebellion, [humanity] would stagnate and injustice would be irremediable.’ Few serious thinkers maintain that it is always unconditionally wrong to start a revolution; and it is equally difficult to believe that it is always and unconditionally wrong to start a war.” [12]

This isn’t to say that Hamas started a war on 7 October. The war is a long-running one, whose origins are found in the actions of Theodor Hertzl and his supporters and successors to create a Jewish state by making an existing country, Palestine, cease to exist. Hamas only opened a new battle in the long-running war on 7 October. The point is that the violent rebellion of the natives must be evaluated against the nature of the change that was sought and resisted (ultimately, the liberation of Palestine, and immediately, the arrest of the disappearance of Palestine and Palestinians.) Hamas appears to have accomplished its immediate aim and for this, for its fight against the iniquities of settler colonialism and apartheid, and for its role in helping to revitalize the pro-Palestinian movement, it deserves credit.

So, is glorifying Hamas’s 7 October rebellion strategically unsound? It may be, but not for the contradictory reasons Abu-Manneh adduces, and nor for any reason I can fathom. The Jacobin contributor has allowed his anger and frustration at Hamas’s Islamist character—which he revealed in an earlier Jacobin article [13]—cloud his judgment about the merits of the organization as a vehicle for the liberation of Palestine. I share Abu-Manneh’s opposition to Hamas’s Islamism, but I recognize the merits of the group’s Operation Al Aqsa Flood. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the political Islam of Hamas is of no relevance to the question of whether the organization’s conduct has advanced the aims of overcoming Zionist settler colonialism and apartheid. Neither Hamas nor its secular compatriot organizations will ever be acceptable to respectable opinion in colonial and settler colonial countries, and bartering away principle for respectability by denouncing Hamas or refusing to give it the credit it deserves, is a fool’s game.

1. Cited in E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, Palgrave MacMillan, 2016, p. 193

2. Three of the five permanent UN Security Council members, the United States, France, and Britain, were once self-declared colonial countries. All retain some colonies today under various euphemistic aliases, such as regions, protectorates, and territories. Puerto Rico, for example, is a de facto US colony, while Guadeloupe and Martinique count among a number of French colonies. Bermuda, Gibraltar, and the Falkland Islands, inter alia, are British colonies. Russia and China were empires, based on the domination of conquered peoples by a metropolitan ethnic elite. 

3. For more on this perspective on international law see the Third World Approaches to International Law Review, https://twailr.com/

4. Benjamin Netanyahu has called Israel “the West’s outpost in the Middle East” (and hence, the instrument of the colonial and colonial settler powers which comprise the West). Quoted in Adam Shatz, “The sea is the same sea,” The London Review of Books, (Vol. 40 No. 16, 30 August 2018).

5. “A time of painful birth and major transformation’: a senior Hamas leader reflects on October 7 and its aftermath,” Mondoweiss,  October 6, 2024; Our Narrative: Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Hamas Media Office; Ben Hubbard and Maria Abi-Habib, “Behind Hamas’s Bloody Gambit to Create a ‘Permanent’ State of War,” New York Times, Nov. 8, 2023; Nelly Lahoud “A Catastrophic Success for Hamas?”, Foreign Affairs, October 23, 2023.

6. Summer Said and Rory Jones, “Gaza Chief’s Brutal Calculation: Civilian Bloodshed Will Help Hamas,” The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2024.

7. “Sinwar certainly achieved his goal of bringing the Palestinian issue to the center of geopolitics,” writes Yaroslav Trofimov in “Sinwar’s Bloody Gambit Changed the Middle East—but Not as He Imagined”, The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 19, 2024: “We make the headlines only with blood,” Sinwar said. “No blood, no news.” Summer Said and Rory Jones, “Gaza Chief’s Brutal Calculation: Civilian Bloodshed Will Help Hamas,” The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2024.

8. Rashid Khalidi, “The Neck and The Sword,” New Left Review, May/June, 2024.

9. “The U.S., Europe and many Arab governments insist the overdue answer is the two-state solution, under which Israel and a Palestinian state would exist side-by-side. The snag is that Israelis and Palestinians no longer believe in it.” Marcus Walker, Fatima Abdul Karim and Anat Peled, “The Way to Fix the Middle East Conflict Looks Obvious—Except to Israelis and Palestinians, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 18, 2024.

10. Rashid Khalidi, ‘A new abyss’: Gaza and the hundred years’ war on Palestine, Guardian, 11 Apr 2024.

11. Carr, p. 193.

12.  Carr, p. 193.

13. Bashir Abu-Manneh, “The Palestinian Resistance Isn’t a Monolith,” Jacobin, April 28, 2024.

The Illegitimacy of Both Israel and the Two-State Solution

August 19, 2024

By Stephen Gowans

Haaretz columnist Gideon Levy recently misattributed the Himalaya of injustices the Israelis have visited upon the Palestinians to ‘the army,’ as if, absent the IDF, Israel—not only its conduct but its very ethos—would become acceptable to world opinion. [1] But were the IDF to disband, or renounce its genocidal conduct, Israel would still be a Jewish state, founded on the robbery of the Palestinians, and committed to their continued dispossession and exile in order to maintain the state’s Jewish character.

The army’s role in Israel is to defend Jewish supremacy and extend the territory over which Jews come first and Palestinians matter not at all. The 1948-9 theft by Jewish nationalist settlers of the Palestinians’ country, along with their homes, land, and property, is Jewish supremacy’s original sin. The IDF defends and promotes it. The two-state solution ignores and conceals it.

The fruits of the Jewish nationalist plunder are thus defended by violence, and extended to such territory in the West Bank which Jewish settlers have not yet completely taken for their own use. The process is summarized by a single word: Zionism—the racist ideology of Jewish nationalism and Palestinian dispossession. Pro-Zionist, as the Palestinian revolutionary Leila Khaled once pointed out, equals anti-Palestinian.

It is Zionism (the project) and its child, Israel, not the IDF (the project’s instrument), that lies, contra Levy, at the root of the problem of Israel. 

To correct Levy, the following injustices, which he attributes to the IDF, are properly understood as the bastards of settler colonial Jewish nationalism.

“…the Sde Teiman base is [Zionism], the human shields used in Gaza are [Zionism], the assassinations are [Zionism]. Forty thousand dead are [Zionism], the destruction of Gaza is [Zionism]; the cruel roadblocks in the West Bank are [Zionism]; the killing of the 3-day-old twins, along with their mother and grandmother, while the father was out obtaining their birth certificate, is [Zionism]; the growing use of drones for killing people in the West Bank is [Zionism]; the pilots, artillery units, armored units, bulldozers, canine units, they are all [Zionism].”

It is difficult to understand how the two-state solution continues to be seen by people ostensibly committed to Leftist or humane values as constituting either a just solution, or even a practical one. Levy himself rejects the two-state solution, not because he dislikes it, but because, with 700,000 Jews in the West Bank, he recognizes that the idea is no longer workable. Scholar Rashid Khalidi calls the two-state solution an Orwellian hoax—a promise to replace the quisling Palestinian Authority with a quisling Palestinian pseudo-state. The two-state solution has always meant one Jewish state plus Palestinian Bantustans, Khalidi argues.

The two-state solution in its current guise rests on UN Security Council Resolution 242, formulated by the United States and Israel, and ratified by the Soviet Union, as a solution to the 1967 Six-Day War, in which Israel conquered the Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and parts of Syrian territory in Jawlan (the Golan Heights).

The resolution (unheeded by Tel Aviv) demanded that Israel withdraw to its pre-1967 position, roughly the armistice lines which ended the conflict of 1948-9 between the Zionist settlers and four of the Arab states—Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. These states had intervened in the war between the Palestinians, who were seeking to keep their country, and the Zionists, who were seeking to make it their own.

At the heart of 1948-9 conflict was UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947, which ended the British Mandate in Palestine and ordered the partition of the country between Jewish and Arab states, to be linked by an economic union, with Jerusalem under international control. The resolution assigned 56 percent of the Palestinians’ country to Jewish settlers, most of whom were recent immigrants, and who comprised less than one-third of the population. The Palestinians, the majority, were granted a state comprising only 42 percent of their country. The remaining two percent was allocated to an internationalized Jerusalem.

Neither the Palestinians, who had been disarmed by the British Mandate, and in any event had little military training, or the Arab armies, which were rendered ineffective by division and the absence of a central command, and were outnumbered by Jewish settler forces by at least three to one, could prevail against the well-organized, well-trained, and well-equipped Zionists. The Jewish nationalists could count on the assistance of Western imperialist countries as well as the Soviet Union, which shipped arms to the Zionists through Czechoslovakia. Indeed, it was the colonialist West in partnership with the USSR that presented and approved the partition of the Palestinians’ country. Little wonder that the great powers should play a key role in helping the settler army rob the Palestinians.

The outcome of the war was, from the Palestinians’ perspective, a Nakba. Zionist settlers conquered 80 percent of the Palestinians’ country—not just the 56 percent which Resolution 181 allocated to a Jewish state, but also half the territory allocated to an Arab state, and, on top of that, West Jerusalem. At the same time, they exiled (ethnically cleansed) 700,000 Palestinians, at least half and probably much more than half of the Palestinian population. In 1967, the Zionist settlers gobbled up the remaining 20 percent of the Palestinians’ country. It is on this one-fifth of Palestine—what is deceptively called ‘occupied Palestinian territories’—that apostles of the two-state solution propose to give the Palestinians a rump state. The term ‘occupied Palestinian territories’ is deceptive because it refers only to the territory Zionist settlers have occupied since 1967, and not the larger territory they’ve occupied since 1948.

The inequity of a two-state solution should be glaring enough. How is it fair to grant Palestinians a tiny, disjointed, fraction of their own country? But the problems run deeper than that. A two-state solution ratifies two fundamental injustices.

The first injustice is the decision of the UN General Assembly, under the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union, to partition Palestine, granting more than half the country to recent Jewish immigrants. The UN General Assembly had no more authority to rob Palestinians of a part of their country than did the British in the 1917 Balfour Declaration to promise Jews a homeland in Palestine. Au fond, Resolution 181 is a violation of two principles: democracy (the Palestinians were opposed to their country’s division) and self-determination. It is also an expression of US and Soviet imperialism. Gifting the larger part of Palestine to recent Jewish immigrants, a minority, contrary to the majority’s wish, and over its objection, suited the electoral goals of the US president, who hoped to strengthen his appeal to Jewish voters, and comported with the geopolitical aims of the Soviet Union, which hoped to build influence in the British-dominated Middle East. Palestinians didn’t count. What’s more, neither the General Assembly or the Security Council had the authority to create two new states, let alone, abolish another (Palestine.)

The second injustice is the ratification of Zionist conquests in the 1948-9 war, which allowed Jewish settler forces to extend their plunder of the Palestinians’ country to 80 percent of the territory from the 56 percent allocated in Resolution 181.

The two-state solution thus fails to address the fundamental injustices at the core of the problem, namely:

  • The negation of democratic principles;
  • The denial of Palestinian self-determination;
  • The spoliation of the Palestinians’ country and the forcible transfer of their land, homes, and property to Jewish settlers with the approval and aid of imperialist powers;
  • The immiseration of the Palestinians by the theft of their land, homes, and property and the corresponding enrichment of Israeli Jews in whose hands these stolen goods have been deposited. The two-state solution offers no mechanism for reversing the colossal inter-ethnic redistribution of wealth, whose major effects have been the ghettoization of millions of Palestinians in squalid refugee camps and the enrichment of Israel and its favored Jewish citizens.

Israel is the outcome of an enormous theft, and an affront against democracy and self-determination, approved (without authority) by the UN, sanctified by international law, backed by the colonialist West, and supported by the Soviet Union. The two-state solution ratifies these crimes, throwing a few crumbs to the plundered and immiserated Palestinians as a sop.

In The Palestine Question, legal scholar Henry Cattan asked whether a two-state solution based on the implementation of Resolution 242 would resolve the Palestine issue. Since it would simply restore the conflict that existed prior to 1967, he answered in the negative.

Would implementation of Resolution 181, and a two-state solution as originally envisaged by the UN in 1947—which at least condescended to allow the Palestinians to keep more of their country—work? No, insisted Cattan, since the resolution was rejected by both the Palestinians in words (who understandably objected to their victimization by a settler colonialism that would deny them self-determination) and Zionist settlers in deeds (who sought in 1948-9 to conquer as much of Palestine as their strength and Soviet arms would allow, and in 1967, when their strength had greatly increased, extended the conquest to the whole of the Palestinians’ country. It has been clear from the beginning, and is all the more evident today, that the Jewish nationalists want all of Palestine, and have no intention of settling for less.)

The solution to the Palestine problem is not, then, a ratification of Zionist settler colonialism, as the apostles of the two-state solution propose; settler colonialism, after all, lies at the heart of the problem. The problem can only be resolved at its core, which is to say, by de-colonizing Palestine, not just occupied ’67 Palestine, that part of the country which the two-state advocates propose to throw to the Palestinians as a sop in the hope of pacifying them, but also occupied ’48 Palestine, the greater part of the country conquered in the 1948-9 war by Jewish nationalist settlers. 

Palestine must become a democratic country, from the River to the Sea, in which all people, regardless of religion or ethnicity, are equal. There should never have been a Jewish state in Palestine, any more than there should have been a white supremacist state in South Africa and another in Rhodesia. All the brutalities of the Zionist regime—the genocide, the official racism, the pogroms, the ethnic cleansing, the prison abuses and torture, the incessant colonial expansion—flow ineluctably from the project of maintaining a Jewish state on the stolen land of the Palestinians.   

The solution to settler colonialism is de-colonization and equality among peoples—not the two-state solution’s ratification of settler-colonialism, not the repudiation of a democratic state in which settlers and natives are equal, and not the relegation of Palestinians to Bantustans within their own country.

1. There is a danger that I have created a misleading impression of Gideon Levy’s views. To be clear, Levy makes similar arguments to my own. He says that “The decisive moment is ‘48. A people came to a populated land and took it over. That’s the core of everything.” He adds that “any solution which will not include some kind of accountability of ‘48 and some kind of compensation — not only in terms of money — will not be a just solution.”  For the future, he envisages “one vote, one person, as in any other democracy,” even though it means “the end of the Jewish state.” See  “It’s too late for the Jewish state”.