The Real Reason Trump is Lashing Out at South Korea

It’s not widely known that South Korea is the world’s fifth ranked military power—more powerful than even Japan, Germany, France, or the UK. By contrast, its foe, North Korea, is ranked thirty-first. Trump is lashing out at South Korea, not because it free-rides on the Pentagon (it doesn’t), but because the Lee administration doesn’t want to become embroiled in Trump’s wars, either against Iran or China.

21 August 2026

By Stephen Gowans

Irritated that South Korea had declined to send warships to the Persian Gulf to help the United States open the Strait of Hormuz, US president Donald Trump lashed out at Seoul, accusing the US ally of free-riding on the United States.  The US “can’t go around and protect all of these countries, especially when they’re not there to help us,” complained Trump. “I said, ‘Wait a minute. We have 39,000 soldiers over there, guarding you from Kim Jong-un, your next-door neighbor, and you’re not going to help us on a very easy military operation in Iran?’” [1]  

The United States has 28,500 soldiers in South Korea, not 39,000. And opening the Strait of Hormuz is the antithesis of an easy military operation. But lay Trump’s arithmetical lapse and military ineptitude aside. Does the United States have to guard South Korea from Kim Jong Un because the country is incapable of defending itself, as Trump alleges? The answer turns out to be fairly obvious and non-controversial.  No, it does not. “South Korea could almost certainly defeat a North Korean invasion on its own.”  [2] That’s the view of Elbridge Colby, the US undersecretary of defense for policy.  So, if Trump thinks the Pentagon has to guard South Korea from Kim Jong Un, he must have slept through meetings with Pentagon staff.

In his 2021 book The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, Colby wrote that “South Korea can … defend itself from a North Korean invasion on its own or with modest US support.” He pointed out that in terms of military expenditures, South Korea spends “more than twenty-five times what North Korea spends” and that “the South Korean military also benefits from an advanced economy and access to US equipment and expertise.” In contrast, North Korea’s conventional military “is antiquated, even decrepit.” South Korea could, Colby concluded, “almost certainly defeat a North Korean invasion on its own.” [3]

This too is the view of South Korea’s defense minister Ahn Gyu-back. In May he said that “we wouldn’t have much trouble defending ourselves.” The country’s president Lee Jae Myung was more emphatic. “Actually, we wouldn’t have any trouble at all.” [4]

Colby’s, Ahn’s, and Lee’s assessments are backed by the numbers. South Korea’s population is twice as large as North Korea’s. Its GDP is 58 times larger. Seoul’s military budget alone is bigger than all of North Korea’s economy—40 percent larger. Its military expenditures are at least over five times as large as Pyongyang’s military outlays (25 times larger according to Colby). South Korea has 4.1 million soldiers (600,000 active-duty troops and 3.5 million reserves), more than twice as many as North Korea, which has 1.9 million soldiers (1.3 million active-duty troops and 600,000 reserves.)   

Of US allies, South Korea is the most powerful militarily—more so than even Japan, Germany, France, and the UK. South Korea’s military is ranked fifth in the world, behind only the United States, China, Russia, and India. North Korea, in contrast, ranks thirty-first, weaker even than tiny Greece. [5]

Currently, South Korean troops make up 99 percent of combined US-South Korean forces in South Korea, 95 percent of the naval forces, and 90 percent of the air forces. [6] In a war with North Korea, almost all of the fighting would be done by South Koreans. Americans would play a peripheral role.

Far from being a security burden, the world’s fifth ranked military power is a formidable US military asset, one Washington would like to use to check its top rival, China. The People’s Republic, according to the leading US military official in Korea, General Xavier Brunson, could “deny American access to vital global markets,” the rationale for dubbing Zhongguo America’s top security threat. [7] The “China problem” in the US view, is not that the country poses a military threat to the US homeland (it doesn’t) but that it could squeeze corporate America and wealthy US investors out of lucrative markets in East Asia.

Brunson heads three military commands.

  • US Forces Korea (USFK), the contingent of 28,500 US troops stationed on the Korean peninsula.
  • The United Nations Command, established by the UN Security Council in 1950 to evict North Korean forces from South Korea. While active hostilities ended on 27 July 1953 with an armistice, the belligerents have never signed a peace treaty and remain technically at war.  For this reason, the UN Command continues. Its current mission is to manage the armistice.
  • The Combined Forces Command. “Combined forces” refers to the South Korean military and USFK together. It is worth repeating that the combined forces are 95 percent South Korean. In peacetime, South Korea’s military is under the control of the the country’s top general. In wartime, it falls under Brunson’s command.

The mission of the UN Command is straightforward: to deter North Korean aggression and “uphold peace and security on the Korean peninsula.” But the missions of the two other commands are broader. Like the UN Command, both aim to defend and protect South Korea. But they are also pledged to “maintain stability in Northeast Asia,” according to the USFK website. As the Pentagon understands it, Brunson’s mission extends beyond the Korean peninsula to all of Northeast Asia. That means that US forces could use South Korea as a base of operations against both China and Russia. It also means that the world’s fifth ranked military power could be pressed into service under Brunson’s command to wage war against either or both of these US rivals. Needless to say, these interpretations raise serious concerns among some, though not all, South Koreans. Conservatives generally favor submitting to US leadership, even if it means becoming entangled in wars with China or Russia. Progressives, in contrast, worry about Washington embroiling them in a military contest with a great power.

Brunson has done little to allay South Koreans’ concerns about the United States enmeshing them in a war that would inevitably have devastating consequences for their lives. South Koreans are not unaware of the fate of the United States’s Persian Gulf allies in the Iran War, countries which, like South Korea, host US military bases in the neighborhood of a US enemy.  Brunson has referred to the Korean Peninsula as “a key strategic terrain vital to … advancing American interests in the region.” [8] When one considers that the key American interest in the region is checking China, and more specifically, preventing it from asserting sovereignty over Taiwan, then South Koreans can be understandably apprehensive about the role the Pentagon foresees them playing in pursuit of US objectives.

A year ago, Brunson told an audience, “If you were to draw a triangle from Tokyo to Seoul to Manila, about 52% of global trade comes through that area. And I think there’s a recognition that we all ought to have that if something happens in the region, there’s going to be a call for nations to react accordingly.” [9] The South Korean newspaper, The Hankyoreh, reported that Brunson was “advocating for building the capacity for the US and [South] Korea to respond to common enemies,” the most important of which, in the US view, is China. [10] Brunson has “repeatedly defined [South] Korea as a military hub for the US containment of China” and believes “that [South] Korea, the US and Japan should join forces to hem in China.” [11]

Washington is modernizing its alliance with South Korea, as part of the Trump Administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy. The strategy seeks to prevent China, Russia, and Iran from becoming hegemons in their respective regions. If any of these powers become regionally dominant, they will, in the strategy’s assessment, be in a position to deny US investors and business-owners access to their regional markets. US strategy and war-planning documents almost invariably cite the need to safeguard US access to foreign markets as a key security aim. The Pentagon and US foreign policy establishment plan wars around the pursuit of business and investor interests.

The plan goes on to assess that the United States does not have the resources to fight more than one potential hegemon at any one time. It must therefore prioritize its efforts and focus on the largest region and most significant potential hegemon: China.

If China is not contained, the plan’s authors write, it will use force to dominate its neighbors, beginning with Taiwan, and achieve regional supremacy. If it achieves regional supremacy, it will be in a position to deny US businesses and investors access to Asian markets.

In order to prioritize China, the strategy calls on the United States to:

  • Offload responsibility for preventing Russia from seeking hegemonic status in Europe to its NATO allies;
  • Transfer resources for defending Ukraine to defending Taiwan;
  • Contain Iran by arming Israel;
  • Modernize its alliance with South Korea. [12]

Modernizing the US-South Korea alliance means shifting command of the officially ongoing war with North Korea from Washington to Seoul. This will free up US resources to concentrate on preventing China from seizing control of Taiwan, and ensure that if China and North Korea initiate concurrent military actions—China against Taiwan and North Korea on the peninsula—that US forces can remain focused on China, while South Korea holds down the Korean front.  As we have seen, Washington recognizes that the world’s fifth ranked military power can easily take on the thirty-first. But for South Korea to assume its new responsibility, authority to command its own forces in wartime must pass from Brunson and the Combined Force Command, where it currently sits, to a South Korean general. The process of carrying out this transition is called OPCON (operational control) transfer.

South Korea regained peacetime OPCON in 1994, and Washington has promised at various times to transfer wartime OPCON. Its promises, however, have always proved empty. South Korean progressives have been in favor of regaining sovereignty over the country’s armed forces and most conservatives, being strongly inclined to philodespotia (love of their imperial masters) have opposed it.  South Korea’s Ministry of Defense has been pushing for the transfer to take place next year but Brunson favors delaying until 2029. [13]

Along with OPCON transfer, Washington has also been pursuing the idea of strategic flexibility: the notion that US forces in Korea should be deployed to missions throughout Northeast Asia, rather than being limited to action on the Korean peninsula. “Colby thinks that USFK’s primary role shouldn’t concern North Korea but China, and has consistently referred to the possibility of either withdrawing or redeploying US troops in Korea.” [14] In Brunson’s words, having the USFK “moored in place is not militarily expedient.” [15] If strategic flexibility means the exit of US forces from South Korea, this would be a boon for all Koreans, even if the exit would be vigorously opposed by conservatives. US forces remaining on the peninsula is quite a different matter. If Washington intends to use South Korea as a platform from which to attack China or Russia, South Koreans will end up as pawns sacrificed in a great power game of international chess.  

The Lee Jae Myung administration “has drawn a line in the sand, holding to the position that the potential for USFK to intervene in the event of a conflict over Taiwan is not up for discussion.” [16] This may be one of the top reasons Trump has lashed out at Seoul. Recently, the Pentagon sent a questionnaire to NATO members, outlining what Trump expects from US subordinates: Support for US foreign policy; access to their military bases; and purchases of US weapons. [17] Lee’s clear opposition to the Pentagon using South Korea as a platform from which to attack US rivals has very likely agitated Trump. Chiding Seoul for failing to assist the United States in the Iran War debacle, and falsely accusing South Koreans of free-riding on the Pentagon, reflects his frustration over the refusal of Seoul to sacrifice South Koreans for US, and Trump’s own, self-serving interests. In short, Seoul is balking at the possibility of South Koreans being used as cannon fodder in a US war against China whose aim is to prevent wealthy US investors and business owners from possibly losing access to lucrative Asian markets.

Stephen Gowans is the author of Patriots, Traitors, and Empires: The Story of Korea’s Fight for Freedom.

1. “Korea latest casualty of Trump’s misplaced frustration over mess in Iran, says US media outlet,” The Hankyoreh, 2026-08-19.

2. Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, Yale University Press, 2021, p. 263.

3. Colby, p. 263. 

4. “Lee calls sovereign defense ‘fundamental’ amid rift with US over OPCON transfer timing,” The Hankyoreh, 2026-05-27.

5. 2026 Military Strength Rating, Global Firepower,https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php; “N. Korea ranks 34th in global firepower ranking; S. Korea 5th,” The Korea Times, Jan 14, 2025; “Kim Jong Un Wants a Military That’s More Than Just Nukes—and Russia Can Help,” The Wall Street Journal,  Sept. 23, 2025; “USFK commander sets early 2029 as target date for OPCON transfer,” The Hankyoreh, 2026-04-24; “Lee says Korea must be able to defend itself without foreign troops, states resolve to reclaim OPCON by 2028,” The Hankyoreh, 2026-04-29.

6. “Korea is more than ready to regain OPCON. Is the US ready to relinquish it?” The Hankyoreh, 2026-06-24.

7. Statement of General Xavier T. Brunson, before the 119th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, April 22, 2026.

8. Ibid.

9. “USFK commander hints at changes to US troop presence in Korea,” The Hankyoreh, 2025-08-11.

10. Ibid.

11. “Why does the USFK commander keep butting heads with Seoul?” The Hankyoreh, 2026-06-29.

12. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, November, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

13. “Lee calls sovereign defense ‘fundamental’ amid rift with US over OPCON transfer timing,” The Hankyoreh, 2026-05-27.

14. “Korea mulls how to respond if US demands ‘strategic flexibility’ of USFK at summit,” The Hankyoreh, 2025-08-20.

15. “USFK commander stresses changing geopolitical environment in pitch to ‘modernize’ alliance,” The Hankyoreh, 2025-08-11.

16. “Korea mulls how to respond if US demands ‘strategic flexibility’ of USFK at summit,” The Hankyoreh, 2025-08-20.

17. “Korea latest casualty of Trump’s misplaced frustration over mess in Iran, says US media outlet,” The Hankyoreh, 2026-08-19.

The US National Security Strategy 2025: Promoting US Billionaires, Stupefying the Working Class, Exploiting Allies, Stifling China

7 December 2025

The rich, in particular, are necessarily interested to support that order of things which can alone secure them in the possession of their own advantages.”—Adam Smith

The enemies of the working class travel in private jets, not migrant dinghies.”—Zarah Sultana

By Stephen Gowans

US National Security Strategy documents are expressions of the interests of the world’s richest country in securing that order of things which can alone secure it in the possession of its own advantages. But more specifically, I think it is fair to say, considering that the ultrarich wield outsize influence over the US state, that US strategy is aimed at securing the advantages of the rich themselves directly, and all other Americans incidentally, if at all. Moreover, to the extent the rich are made richer by the Strategy, it may only be a result of the poor being made poorer. In the view of Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments: “The affluence of the rich supposes the indigence of the many”; of Victor Hugo in The Man Who Laughs: “The paradise of the rich is made out of the hell of the poor”; and Karl Marx in Capital: “Accumulation of wealth at one pole is at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation at the opposite pole.” In line with these arguments, we might expect that in proportion as the Strategy makes the lives of the rich richer, it will make those of the working class meaner.

The National Security Strategy 2025 is a plan, as Trump’s White House puts it, “To ensure that America remains the world’s strongest, richest, most powerful, and most successful country for decades to come.” We can be sure that when the White House says “America” its means “America’s billionaires,” which the administration includes, in greater numbers than any other in history, and which is openly and unapologetically backed by billionaires and is ardently committed to securing them in the possession of their own advantages, through numerous blessings, from munificent tax cuts, to deregulation, to ample opportunities for corruption.

There are at least a dozen billionaires in Trump’s cabinet and among those appointed to major roles. Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and Tom Barrack, Trump envoys working on key foreign policy issues, are confirmed billionaires, as is commerce secretary Howard Lutnick. Treasury secretary Scott Bessent is a near billionaire. David Sacks, a near billionaire, oversees AI and crypto, the industries in which he has accumulated his wealth. [See note 1 below.] The world’s richest people contributed to Trump’s re-election campaign, transition, and inauguration.

“There were at least 17 billionaires in attendance at Donald Trump’s second inauguration, collectively worth more than $1 trillion”, according to The Washington Post. They included the world’s top three wealthiest people: Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and Mark Zuckerberg, who “took places of honor next to Trump’s family.” Seated nearby were several other billionaires, including Louis Vuitton, the world’s fifth richest person, “Apple CEO Tim Cook, former Marvel owner Isaac Perlmutter and media mogul Rupert Murdoch.”

Billionaires back Trump because he is, himself, a billionaire—the first ever to hold the office of president; because he has loaded his cabinet with their class brethren, other billionaires, who are sure to see the world as they see it and favor their interests; and because he unapologetically caters to billionaire interests. He does so at the expense of the polloi, while aiming to maintain political and social stability by persuading a substantial fraction of the White Christian working class, that he is, notwithstanding the reality, their champion.

This isn’t to say that a cabinet with fewer or no billionaires, or even completely devoid of people of wealth, would produce a national security strategy that is any less ardently committed to securing an order of things that delivers enormous advantages to the wealthy as its priority. Politicians, whether wealthy or not, are dependent on the rich for campaign contributions and post-political-career opportunities. They naturally try to stay on the good side of the rich, and are greatly inclined to lick their boots, since servility to the wealthy eases the road to office.

In addition, the wealthy exercise an enormous sway over public opinion through their control of mass media, think-tanks, public relations firms, and the research agenda at universities. More importantly, their ownership and control of the economy give them the power to make or break governments.  The only way governments can act against the interests of the wealthy and for the interests of the working class is by taking capital, enterprises, and investment decisions out of private hands and bringing them under democratic control. What this means is that capitalist control of the state is over-determined. It is affected by the participation of members of the capitalist class in key positions of the state and the class’s control of the ideological environment. But it is also affected by the influence the class exercises through its ownership and control of the economy—a power which allows it to cripple governments that fail to promote its agenda by ceasing to invest or by moving capital to other countries. No government wants to lose major investments and will kowtow to investor needs to keep capital flowing. The abundance of billionaires in the Trump administrations is an instance of the wealthy exercising direct control over public policy and the day-to-day decision-making of the White House, but even without billionaires in the cabinet, the manifold indirect influences of the wealthy class on government constrains the state to pursue capitalist class interests.

The Biden administration had far fewer billionaires and people of significant wealth, but its key players were members of billionaire-controlled and -directed think-tanks, such as The Council on Foreign Relations, and were thus loyal servants of the US capitalist class. The Biden administration’s national security strategy was no less committed to defending and promoting US billionaire interests around the world than the Trump administration’s is, though the means of accomplishing this goal and the justifications were not wholly the same. For example, the Trump White House is quite open about using its security strategy to pursue profit-making opportunities for US investors and businesses, while the Biden administration cloaked its pursuit of advantages for US billionaires and corporate America in the language of defending and promoting democracy. The New York Times, virtually the house organ of the Democratic Party, complained in a headline that “Trump’s Security Strategy Focuses on Profit, Not Spreading Democracy“, an allusion to the allegedly loftier aims of the Biden administration’s national security strategy. In 1966, the songwriter Phil Ochs wrote a song about US national security strategy titled Cops of the World, which contained a line that perfectly anticipated the Biden administration’s approach to presenting how it would use the power of the US military to defend and promote the welfare of the US business class. The line was “the name for our profits is democracy.”

Analysis of the Security Strategy

The National Security Strategy 2025 has, for me, five salient themes.

#1. Washington will prevent any rival state from doing the following in the Western Hemisphere:

  • Positioning military “forces or other threatening capabilities”; and
  • Owning or controlling assets that Washington deems strategically vital.

While the document doesn’t spell out who the rival states are, there can be little doubt that they are China and Russia. And while the Strategy doesn’t define what strategically vital assets are, they likely include the Panama Canal and Greenland, at minimum.  The White House has titled the pledge to keep competitors out of the Western Hemisphere, The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

The Monroe Doctrine, promulgated by President James Monroe in 1823, warned European powers that the United States would not allow them to acquire new territory in the Western Hemisphere or form alliances with hemispheric states. In exchange, the United States would stay out of Europe’s wars.

In 1904, Theodore Roosevelt updated the doctrine with his eponymous Roosevelt Corollary. Washington, the president warned, would intervene in any country in the Western Hemisphere that engaged in conduct of which it did not approve. Roosevelt’s corollary was a statement of the principle of suprema lex regis voluntas—the supreme law of the Western Hemisphere is the will of the US government, and, I would add, as a matter of sociology, the class that dominates it. It was also, obviously, a statement of informal empire.

Trump’s corollary is not so much a corollary as a restatement of the Monroe Doctrine, aimed not at Europe, as the original was, but at Russia and China.

#2. Washington will continue to engage in a struggle with China over control of sea lanes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The struggle, from Washington’s point of view, will pivot on preventing Beijing from controlling Taiwan.

Washington, along with its court journalists and intellectuals, is fond of pointing out how much of the world’s shipping flows through the South China Sea. “Given that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea,” the document declares, disruptions would have “major implications for the U.S. economy.” Were “a potentially hostile power to impose a toll system over one of the world’s most vital lanes of commerce or—worse—to close and reopen it at will,” the consequences could be catastrophic for the US economy. Hence, no US rival (i.e., China) must be allowed to control this body of water.

The tendentious character of the Strategy’s argument is evident if we consider that much of the shipping that passes through the South China Sea flows to and from China. If any state has an interest in keeping the South China Sea open, China is it. Beijing’s planners can reasonably fear that the United States, a competitor, could impose a toll system over this vital (to China) lane of commerce or—worse—close and reopen it at will, severing China’s imports of oil from the Persian Gulf, impeding the flow of raw materials from around the globe, and blocking its exports to foreign markets.

The United States controls the sea lanes of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and would like to maintain its control, not because US planners are worried about threats to the US economy if control slips away, but because exercising control over the shipping lanes means leverage over China. US control of critical commercial maritime routes comports with a key goal of the Strategy: “To prevent the emergence of dominant adversaries.” A China that could be blockaded at any moment by the US military, is not likely to grow large enough to surpass the United States as the world’s supreme economic and military power. Hence, Washington has an interest in projecting prepotent military power into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. At the same time, China would like to control the very same maritime routes to protect its own economy from US blockade, disruption, and blackmail, and very likely as well, to gain power over its regional rivals, India and Japan.

The key to this struggle is Taiwan. The Chinese navy is hemmed in by a series of islands, running from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines to the Malay Peninsula, known as the First Island Chain. The islands are under the influence and control, to various degrees, of the US military. The weakest link in the chain is Taiwan. There is no meaningful US military presence on the island, and Beijing claims it as its own territory, but has yet to bring the island under its control. If Beijing achieves its ambition to recover Taiwan, it will be able to more readily project its navy into the South China and Philippine Seas, and from there to the Indian and Pacific Oceans, reducing the chances the US Navy will be able to enforce a blockade.

To keep Taiwan out of Beijing’s hands, Washington proposes to:

  • Preserve “military overmatch”, that is, to deploy greater firepower to the Indo-Pacific region than China can match.
  • Increase the US military presence in the First Island Chain.
  • Press Japan, South Korea, and Australia to increase their contributions of military equipment and personnel to US-led alliances in order to strengthen the US effort to keep China bottled up within the First Island Chain.

The plan is, thus, in large part, the outline of a program to use the US military to obtain an ongoing commercial advantage over China.

#3. Washington will pressure its allies to increase their contributions to the maintenance of US global military supremacy. The Strategy argues that the United States counts among its “many allies and partners dozens of wealthy, sophisticated nations that must assume primary responsibility for their regions and contribute far more to our collective defense.” It goes on to note that “President Trump has set a new global standard with the Hague Commitment, which pledges NATO countries to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense and which our NATO allies have endorsed and must now meet.”

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Washington is not asking its allies to assume primary responsibility for their regions. Japan, South Korea, and Australia, for example, are not being asked to defend themselves, or lead military efforts, against China. Instead, they are being asked to spend more money on arms (which, owing to the size of the US arms industry means much of the higher military spending will benefit US merchants of death) and on personnel, all of which are part of formal military alliances under the control of the United States. Ancient Roman armies were comprised of legionaries (soldiers from Rome) and auxiliaries (soldiers from allied states) under the command of a Roman general. When allies committed more soldiers, Rome grew in strength. Washington is simply following the same logic. What allies contribute redounds directly to US military power. Japan, South Korea, Australia, and NATO countries are being asked to contribute more money, more soldiers, and more (mainly US-purchased) equipment to their US-led military alliances; hence, to US military projects and supremacy.

The same is true of Europe. Washington makes a pretense of Europe being asked to take on greater responsibility for its defense. But that’s nonsense. The principal European military organization, NATO, is an alliance that is always under the command of a US general, as the NATO charter stipulates. NATO is a US instrument; it always has been and will always remain. Washington isn’t asking Europe to take command of NATO or the defense of Europe, nor the task of confronting Russia. That remains a US leadership responsibility. It’s being asked, nay, told, to contribute more money and troops to what will always be a US-directed project. This will allow the Pentagon to shift a significant part of its forces currently deployed to Europe to the Indo-Pacific region to help impede China’s efforts to recover Taiwan. The project of confronting Russia will remain one in which Europe contributes the bulk of the equipment and personnel, as it always has done, but it will commit more than in the past, and the US contribution will correspondingly diminish, though US leadership will continue.

Two other points, both significant.

First, it is not the case that Washington believes that Europe has underspent on its militaries and has thus left the continent vulnerable to Russian aggression. On the contrary, the Strategy document declares that “European allies enjoy a significant hard power advantage over Russia by almost every measure, save nuclear weapons.” This is obvious to anyone who has taken the time to look at the numbers. What this means is that the discourse favored by the news media, NATO’s secretary-general, and some governments, that European countries must increase their military spending, because Russia stands as a looming threat, is utter nonsense. Even the White House doesn’t believe this.

Second, the Strategy seeks to “restabilize” Europe by seeking to bring about an end to the conflict in Ukraine and, importantly, an end to “the reality of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance.”

#4. The White House believes that Europe is imperiled, not by Russia, but by liberal immigration policies and the suppression of White nationalist political parties and their anti-immigrant discourse. “The larger issues facing Europe,” the strategy document opines, “include”: 

  • “Migration policies that are transforming the continent and creating strife”, and
  • “Censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition.”

The Strategy’s authors worry that demographic change in Europe is undermining the continent’s Western Civilizational values, noting that it “is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European” (in other words, majority non-White and Muslim). “As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.”

The fear of Eastern peoples undermining Western Civilization was a particular concern of the Nazis, who saw Jews and Communists as Eastern. The White House’s concerns about immigration are not only consistent with those of the Nazis and contemporary White nationalist parties in Europe today, but also with the Trump administration’s own racist domestic policy of mass deportations of illegal immigrants and banning immigration from such countries as Afghanistan and Somalia. The Washington Post summarized White House thinking on immigration as: “Somalis are ‘garbage,’ and ‘we don’t want them in our country.’ Migration from ‘all Third World countries’ should be halted. Any foreign national deemed ‘noncompatible with Western civilization’ must be deported.” Like the Nazis, who worked to replace Klassenkampf (the struggle of classes) with Razzenkampf (the struggle of races) in order to divert the working class from its efforts to liberate itself from the miseries and disadvantages of capitalism, the Trump administration is likewise engaged in a project of scapegoating immigrants to keep the White Christian working class from blaming its woes on Trump’s billionaire cohorts and their program of exploitation of the poor and left-behind and indulgence for the rich and comfortable.

#5. The United States will continue to dominate West Asia to ensure the region’s oil resources remain under US supervision, while at the same time maintaining the US position as the world’s top exporter of oil and gas. In this way, Washington will control a vital input into the economies of Japan and Germany, potentially threatening economic competitors, and its top rival, China. Regarding the latter, US strategy stipulates that Washington will control not only West Asia, a major source of energy for China, but also the sea lanes connecting the Middle East to China. This goes a long way toward meeting the major US strategy objective of preventing the emergence of a dominant adversary.

Finally, I will note that, as an obiter dictum, the White House says that it will continue to protect Israel. It doesn’t say why. I can’t help but think that one of the reasons is that Israel is viewed as an outpost of Western Civilization in the East and that, comprising a Jewish master race that is mostly white, it is, as a consequence, a White supremacist regime—one moreover that embodies the most repugnant aspects of the Western tradition (settler colonialism, racism, genocide, imperialism), the very foundations of US wealth and power. Israel is a model of the White nationalist golden age that appears to lie so close to the heart of the US president.  In chiding the Europeans for allowing their continent to undergo an immigration-induced demographic change, and then censuring various European powers for repressing anti-immigrant, White nationalist, discourse, the Trump White House poses as a champion of Western (i.e., White Christian) Civilization. This is a civilization which, under the guidance of Trump and his Corollary, aims to keep Eastern power out of the Western Hemisphere, but claims a prerogative to impose Western power on the East. So it is that while re-asserting the Monroe Doctrine, Washington at the same time makes clear that it intends to control the Eastern Hemisphere, especially the sea lanes that connect China to the rest of the world.

The Indo-Pacific region is very important to the Trump White House. It is, the Strategy notes, “already the source of almost half of the world’s GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP), and one third based on nominal GDP. That share is certain to grow over the 21st century. Which means that the Indo-Pacific is already and will continue to be among the next century’s key economic and geopolitical battlegrounds. To thrive at home, we must successfully compete there.”

Thriving at home can be taken to mean the US billionaire class growing fatter, while it sucks the blood of the US working class, as it endeavors to keep it in a state of stupefaction by recruiting it to a campaign of saving Western Civilization from the immigration of “garbage” from the global south. Concurrently, the US state will plunder the working class of allied countries that will be forced to contribute money, equipment, and personnel to US-led military projects aimed at making Trump’s fellow US billionaires richer. At the same time, Washington will keep its boot-heel on Chinese energy sources and vital sea lanes, aided amply by its allies. This will be done in the service of the White House’s overarching goal: Ensuring that US investors and corporate America secure possession of the lion’s share of the major profit-making opportunities of the Western Hemisphere and Asia. 

The New York Times’ take on the security strategy is that it reflects the “world as seen from the White House”—one in which “America can use its vast powers to make money.” I would amend the assessment somewhat. The strategy reflects a world as seen from a White House that is controlled by a battalion of billionaires, and that uses race and anti-immigrant rhetoric to divert the White Christian working class from the reality that it is being fleeced and immiserated. The world the billionaires see is one in which US investors and major US businesses use the vast power of the US state to cut Chinese enterprises and billionaires out of the action to ensure that the lion’s share of the world’s economic surplus remains in the hands of the Donald Trumps, Steve Witkoffs, Jared Kushners, Howard Luttnicks, and their friends, associates, business and golf partners, and political backers, among them Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and Mark Zuckerberg—in other words, the US capitalist class.

1. According to The Washington Post, 13 billionaires — including Donald Trump —have held roles in the administration this year. They are:

  1. Donald Trump, President of the United States, Net worth: $5.1 billion
  2. Howard Lutnick, Secretary, Commerce Department, Net worth: $3.2 billion
  3. Linda McMahon, Secretary, Education Department, Net worth: $3 billion
  4. Steve Witkoff, Assistant to the president and special envoy for peace missions, Net worth: $2 billion
  5. Kelly Loeffler, Administrator, Small Business Administration, Net worth: $1.3 billion
  6. Elon Musk, Leader, U.S. DOGE Service (resigned in late May), Net worth: $342 billion
  7. Joe Gebbia, Chief design officer, Net worth: $8.3 billion
  8. Antonio Gracias, Volunteer, DOGE (left in July), Net worth: $2.2 billion
  9. Tilman Fertitta, Ambassador to Italy and San Marino, Net worth: $11.3 billion
  10. Melinda Hildebrand, Ambassador to Costa Rica, Net worth: $7.7 billion
  11. Stephen Feinberg, Deputy secretary, Defense Department, Net worth: $5 billion
  12. Warren Stephens, Ambassador to Britain, Net worth: $3.4 billion,
  13. Paul Atkins, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Net worth: $1.2 billion

The list omits Jared Kushner and Tom Barrack, who may not be billionaires, but near billionaires.