Venezuela and the Imperialism of Peace

5 January 2026

Stephen Gowans

A careful reading of The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times offers the following account of what led up to the Trump administration’s decision to abduct Venezuelan president Nicolos Maduro. This account also brings to the fore the distinction between the imperialism of war and what Lenin called “the imperialism of peace.”

In 2007, Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chavez, changed the terms under which US oil firms could operate in his country, home to the world’s largest reserves of oil.  ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips were presented with new contracts giving Caracas majority control over joint ventures. The US oil giants balked, and sued. The two companies were compensated, but believed they were not adequately indemnified. [1] Ultimately, this would lead to Washington imposing sanctions on Venezuela which blocked US investment in the South American country’s oil industry with one exception: Chevron was granted a special licence to continue to operate in Venezuela, with restrictions. [2]

US sanctions crippled Venezuela’s oil industry and devastated the country’s economy. Since 2013, the year Maduro became president, GDP has contracted by 80 percent—the largest economic collapse in modern history outside of war. Economic misery has driven eight million Venezuelans, about one-quarter of the population, from the country. [3]

With Venezuela’s economy in crisis, the Maduro government backtracked, opening the oil industry to private investment on attractive terms. [4] The re-opening was orchestrated by Delcy Rodriquez, who would become Maduro’s vice-president, and, with Maduro’s abduction, the country’s new leader.

The US oil majors began to pressure the Trump administration to lift the sanctions that kept them from taking advantage of Rodriguez’s reforms.  “They told Trump administration officials that … Caracas was so desperate that they would welcome U.S. firms with tantalizing terms not seen by the industry in decades—including no-bid contracts and little environmental or regulatory oversight.” Moreover, the US oil majors complained that Chinese and Russian firms were monopolizing the advantages the newly re-opened Venezuelan oil industry offered. [5]

The White House began to talk to Maduro about lifting US sanctions. [6] Trump told the Venezuelan leader that he wanted him “to push Chinese and Russian oil companies out of Venezuela and to open up a bigger role for American companies.” [7] Maduro agreed. In October, The New York Times reported that the Venezuelan president “offered Washington far-reaching concessions that would essentially eliminate the vestiges of resource nationalism at the core of Mr. Chávez’s movement.” In addition, he “also agreed to limit Venezuela’s economic ties with China, Russia and Iran and to stop selling oil to Cuba.” [8]

The two parties were keen to strike a deal because an agreement would be mutually rewarding. The US oil majors wanted the profit-making opportunities Venezuela could offer, and Maduro wanted out from under the crushing weight of US sanctions that had crippled his country’s economy.

But there was a problem. Trump’s top aides persuaded the president that Maduro couldn’t be trusted; that he would eventually renege on any deal the US struck with him. As a result, Maduro was told that a condition of the deal was his exit. If he refused to step down, the United States would use force to oust him. Maduro demurred, possibly believing that Trump was bluffing. [9] The Pentagon assembled an armada in the Caribbean to pressure the Venezuelan president to reconsider.

Meanwhile, Washington had to figure out who would take over from Maduro. The administration quickly settled on the country’s vice-president. She had “impressed Trump officials with her management of Venezuela’s crucial oil industry” and “intermediaries persuaded the administration that she would protect and champion future American energy investments in the country.” The White House believed they could work with her. [10] And why not? Both Washington and Caracas were keen on bringing US oil giants back to Venezuela and Rodriguez had taken the lead role in bringing about the oil sector renovations that had aroused the US energy companies’ interest. She could be counted on to do Washington’s bidding, because Washington’s bidding largely aligned with what she thought needed to be done. “She is essentially willing to do what we think is necessary to make Venezuela great again,” Trump said. “Very simple.” [11]

In the event US officials had misjudged Rodriguez’s tractability, they had a back-up plan. To ensure she played ball, she was warned that she would share Maduro’s fate if she stepped out of line. According to Trump, if Rodriguez “doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro.”  Some sections of the US media complained that Rodriguez is a socialist who is railing against US encroachment on Venezuela’s sovereignty, and that Maria Corina Machado, the “conservative former member of the National Assembly from an affluent Venezuelan family [with] decades-long ties to Washington,” would have been a better choice. But Marco Rubio, the secretary of state and national security advisor, rejoined: “We’re going to make an assessment on the basis of what they do, not what they say publicly …  not what … they’ve done in the past.” [12] From Washington’s perspective, socialist or not, Rodriguez is clearly the better choice. She offers the reasonable prospect of producing what regime change would deliver—and within a framework of political stability. Installing Machado, in contrast, would mean incurring the enormous cost and uncertainties of waging a regime change war which, in the end, if it succeeded, would likely produce such great political instability that Venezuela would not be an attractive field for investment.

Imperialism can be defined simply as the process of one state imposing its will on another. The United States has clearly been trying to make Venezuela do what it wants, by using sanctions, and, of late, an oil blockade, to cripple the Venezuelan economy to force the country’s leadership to make changes to the terms under which it will allow US oil companies to operate. Washington has visited enough sanctions-generated devastation upon Venezuela to compel the government to change the rules governing its oil industry. These changes have aroused the interest of the US oil majors, but the energy companies are unable to take advantage of the new opportunities, unless the US sanctions that block them for operating in Venezuela are lifted. Accordingly, the industry has pressed the Trump administration to strike a deal with Caracas that would see US oil majors return to Venezuela.

The key to the imperialist process in Venezuela has been sanctions, not the armada the Trump administration has assembled in the Caribbean, and not the raid on the Venezuelan capital to abduct the president. Military measures have played a minor role compared to the role economic coercion has played; the imperialism of war has been less significant, in this case, than the imperialism of peace. It is true that military measures have been used to close the deal (to try to persuade Maduro to step down) but the deal was largely brought about by sanctions. Had it not been for Washington’s economic coercion, it is unlikely that Caracas would have changed the rules of investing in its oil industry.

I mention this because too little attention is paid to “the imperialism of peace”—what strong states do to impose their will on weak states without going to war. Lenin emphasized that strong states wage war against weak states as a continuation, by other means, of imperialist politics that are practiced during peacetime. Imperialism, in other words, is a broad category that includes war of aggression as only one mechanism of many for inducing another state to do one’s bidding. Imperialism doesn’t happen just in times of war; it is ongoing, even during peacetime.

The result of paying too little attention to the imperialism of peace is that voices aren’t raised in opposition to imperialist conduct unless it involves violence. People immediately took to the streets to protest Washington’s abduction of Maduro, but the abduction was small potatoes next to the enormous sanction-induced devastation Washington has wreaked on Venezuela. The sanctions have harmed and immiserated millions of Venezuelans; the abduction harmed less than 200. The sanctions have carried more weight in imposing the US will on Venezuela than has Maduro’s abduction; the ousted president had already agreed to the terms the US wishes to impose on Venezuela; the only condition he refused was his exit.

Economic coercion is sometimes referred to as “economic atom bombing” in an attempt to show that sanctions can be as destructive, if not more so, than the violence of war. John Mueller and Karl Mueller wrote a famous article in Foreign Affairs, titled “Sanctions of Mass Destruction,” showing that sanctions have killed more people than all the weapons of destruction ever used, including the atomic bombs used to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki. [13]  A study published in The Lancet Global Health in July 2025, conducted by economists Francisco Rodríguez, Silvio Rendón, and Mark Weisbrot from the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), estimated that every year US and EU sanctions are responsible for a half-million premature deaths worldwide. [14] In light of this, the necessity of building anti-imperialism movements that can take full account of the imperialism of peace should be examined. The danger of anti-war movements, from Lenin’s perspective, was that being so averse to war they would accept the imperialism of peace as a win, and therefore never overcome or even see the root cause of the wars of aggression they so loathed and feared.

Update

The Wall Street Journal has reported that a “classified U.S. intelligence assessment determined top members of Nicolás Maduro’s regime—including Vice President Delcy Rodríguez—would be best positioned to lead a temporary government in Caracas and maintain near-term stability.” (“CIA Concluded Regime Loyalists Were Best Placed to Lead Venezuela After Maduro,” Jan. 5, 2026)

“The report concluded that Edmundo González, widely seen as the actual winner of the 2024 election against Maduro, and Machado would struggle to gain legitimacy as leaders while facing resistance from pro-regime security services and political opponents.”

The report also said that despite “initially striking a defiant tone,” Rodriguez has since “signaled her willingness to work with the U.S. and has spoken with Rubio.”

On January 6, The Wall Street Journal reported that Rodriguez “and Trump might be on the same page.” (“Venezuelan Regime’s New Strategy: Appease Trump to Survive”.) “Since becoming vice president in 2018, the 56-year-old has consolidated influence as Maduro’s top interlocutor with the private sector and trade partners. She has long advocated for American oil companies to pump crude in the country and says the only thing keeping them out are the economic sanctions leveled during Trump’s first term that bar companies from working in Venezuela’s energy sector.”

 1. “Trump’s Claim That Venezuela ‘Stole’ U.S. Oil Fields Touches Nationalist Nerve,” New York Times, Dec. 17, 2025; “Trump Orders Blockade of Sanctioned Oil Tankers In and Out of Venezuela, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 16, 2025; “Trump Wants to Unlock Venezuela’s Oil Reserves. A Huge Challenge Awaits,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 3, 2026.

2. “Explainer: Why Chevron still operates in Venezuela despite US sanctions,” Euronews, December 29, 2025.

3. “Venezuela’s New Leader Is a Hardline Socialist Like Maduro,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2026; “Another U.S. Attempt to Topple Maduro Would Be a Disaster,” Wall Street Journal, Nov. 7, 2025.

4. “Trump’s Tanker Crackdown Paralyzes Venezuelan Oil Exports,” New York Times, Dec. 23, 2025; “Venezuela’s Capital Is Booming. Is This the End of the Revolution?” Feb. 1, 2020.

5. “Trump Was Skeptical of Ousting Maduro—Until He Wasn’t,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 4, 2026.

6. “Trump Says U.S. Is ‘In Charge’ of Venezuela, While Rubio Stresses Coercing It, New York Times, Jan. 4, 2026.

7. “Venezuela’s Oil Is a Focus of Trump’s Campaign Against Maduro,” New York Times, Dec. 16, 2025.

8. “Venezuela’s Maduro Offered the U.S. His Nation’s Riches to Avoid Conflict, New York Times, Oct. 10, 2025.

9. “Trump Was Skeptical of Ousting Maduro—Until He Wasn’t, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 4, 2026; “Venezuela’s Oil Is a Focus of Trump’s Campaign Against Maduro, New York Times, Dec. 16, 2025.

10. “How Trump Fixed On a Maduro Loyalist as Venezuela’s New Leader,” New York Times, Jan. 4, 2026.

11. “Venezuela’s New Leader Is a Hardline Socialist Like Maduro, “Wall Street Journal January 4, 2026.

12. “Trump Says U.S. Is ‘In Charge’ of Venezuela, While Rubio Stresses Coercing It,” New York Times, Jan. 4, 2026.  

13. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/1999-05-01/sanctions-mass-destruction

14. https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(25)00189-5/fulltext